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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: IS A GOOD FAITH
STANDARD NEEDED TO PRESERVE A LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
Frederick A. Bernardi *
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has frequently
tangled with the vitality of the exclusionary rule as a mechanism
for protecting substantive fourth amendment rights. During these
encounters, the Court has variously moved to restrict the territory
covered by the rule, a trend that may peak with adoption of Jus-
tice White's good faith formulation. Mr. Bernardi evaluates this
trend in three parts: first, by examining the shifting rationales em-
ployed by the Court to sustain the rule; second, by considering the
present rule's efficacy in protecting fourth amendment rights; and
finally, by analyzing and advocating Justice White's good faith
standard. He concludes that the current Court's retrenchment is
not only justified, but also essential to preserve substantive
fourth amendmeni rights.
INTRODUCTION
The recent case of Michigan v. DeFillippoI represents the closest example
to date of a situation in which the United States Supreme Court has allowed
the direct use of unlawfully seized evidence to establish the prosecution's
case-in-chief in a criminal trial. In rendering the DeFillippo decision, the
Court has taken another significant step toward adoption of a good faith stan-
dard to govern application of the exclusionary rule in the realm of fourth
amendment violations.
The DeFillippo case has prompted this writer to take a fresh look at the
exclusionary rule. It appears that if the rule is not shortly abandoned
altogether as a means of enforcing the fourth amendment, it is virtually cer-
tain that the Court will adopt some species of a good faith-bad faith calcu-
lus to govern the rule's application. The Court has positioned itself to adopt
this new standard by gradually reformulating the justificatory rationale given
in support of the rule's position in fourth amendment jurisprudence. As will
be seen, analytical emphasis has gradually changed from one of rights to one
of remedies, the Court now focusing primarily on the rationale of deterrence
in exclusionary rule decisions. The first part of this Article studies the juris-
prudence of the exclusionary rule as it has developed and changed over the
past century.
The second part of this Article reviews and discusses the major criticisms
of the rule in its present form. The greater portion of this analysis attempts
to establish the thesis that the present rule, instead of protecting privacy
interests, actually works the exact opposite effect, perhaps posing the
*Member, Illinois Bar. B.B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Notre
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1. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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greatest, single impediment to a liberal interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment.
Finally, part three of this Article defends Justice White's formulation of
the good faith standard as set forth in his dissenting opinion in Stone v.
Powell .2 The argument is made that an explicit adoption of a good faith
standard not only will lessen the tension which presently exists between the
need for effective law enforcement and the desire to protect fourth amend-
ment rights, but also will help eliminate the plethora of legitimate criticisms
which attend the rule in its present form.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
The development of the exclusionary rule 3 can be understood best by
studying the gradual shift over time in the justifications articulated for the
rule in Supreme Court opinions. Essentially three jurisprudential considera-
2. 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
3. As a matter of constitutional implementation, an exclusionary rule of evidence has been
imposed by the Supreme Court in four areas of criminal procedure: (1) to implement the pro-
scription against compelled self-incrimination embodied in the fifth amendment (see, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)); (2) to protect an
accused's right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment (see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964)); (3) to implement the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment (see, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914)); and (4) to redress police intrusions that "shock the conscience" of the court
(Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), this fourth category has lost much, if not all, of its
importance.
Although application of an exclusionary rule of evidence to the products of certain fifth and
sixth amendment violations might certainly be questioned, this Article treats only that aspect of
the rule which relates to exclusions resulting from illegal searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment. The reason for this selection is important to the position this discussion takes; a
rule which excludes from the fact-finding process evidence admitted to be of utmost reliability
should serve significant and veritable social interests to merit its continued existence. There are
usually important considerations of reliability at issue when evidence is derived from violations
of the fifth and sixth amendments. A confession derived from the use of physical force has
questionable reliability. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936). And the Miranda
decision can fairly be seen as one designed to preclude not only the physically coercive tech-
niques, such as those used in Brown, but the psychological ones as well:
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologi-
cally rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before ..."this Court has
recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
384 U.S. at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
Similar questions of reliability have arisen in instances where the Supreme Court has seen
the implication of sixth amendment rights. For example, in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court held that testimony in
court about an identification made of the accused at a lineup in the absence of appointed
counsel violated the accused's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel and therefore
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tions have been enunciated by the Court in support of the rule: (1) that the
rule is necessary to give real substance to the privacy interests of those
citizens who are the actual victims of unlawful intrusions; (2) that the rule is
needed to preserve judicial integrity; 5 and (3) that the rule is required to
deter unlawful police conduct. 6 The Court has never definitively ruled that
any one rationale, to the exclusion of the others, supports the rule. Yet,
recent opinions reveal a shift in emphasis from the individual privacy and
judicial integrity rationales to deterrence.7 By shifting concentration to de-
terrence, the Court has positioned itself to adopt a good faith standard to
govern the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment cases.
REDRESSING INVASIONS OF PRIVACY INTERESTS
Prior to 1886, courts almost universally acknowledged that the manner in
which evidence was obtained was irrelevant to questions of its admissibility
in court.8 Judges were loath to exclude evidence of unquestioned reliability
and probative value. Criminal trials were not to become fettered by the
litigation of collateral issues,' and how reliable evidence arrived at the
courthouse door was regarded as just such an issue."
should have been excluded from use by the prosecuting agencies. Clearly, the Court was con-
cerned with the reliability of such identification procedures: "A major factor contributing to the
high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses
for pretrial identification." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an arrested person be
taken "without unnecessary delay" before a committing magistrate. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). In
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and again in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957), the Supreme Court held that statements obtained from an accused during a period
of unreasonable delay between arrest and presentation before a magistrate were inadmissible in
subsequent criminal proceedings. The Court's rulings in these cases, however, were based on
an exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower federal courts, not on the Constitution. The
exclusionary rule as a device used by the Court in this context is not treated in this Article.
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914).
5. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960).
6. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
7. See text accompanying notes 33-134 infra.
8. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 165 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
9. The idea that the litigation of search and seizure issues is in some degree collateral to
the criminal proceeding itself has persisted in large part to this very day. For example, rule
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that "[m]otions to suppress evidence"
be raised prior to trial, FED. R. CtuM. P. 12(b), and rule 12() provides that "[flailure by a party
to raise defenses or objections or make requests which must be made prior to trial . . .
constitute[s] waiver thereof, but the court for good cause shown may grant relief from the
waiver." Id. 12(f).
10. A clear statement of this now archaic judicial posture can be found in the old Mas-
sachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841):
[T]hough papers and other subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken from
the possession of the party against whom they are offered or otherwise unlawfully
obtained, this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the
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In 1886, however, the United States Supreme Court handed down a deci-
sion regarded today by many constitutional historians as the genesis of the
modern fourth amendment exclusionary rule. In Boyd v. United States," the
Court had before it a constitutional challenge to a federal customs revenue
statute 12 that empowered federal judges to compel production of private
business records in civil forfeiture proceedings. The statute provided that
the allegations in the forfeiture proceeding would be confessed against the
defendant if he failed to produce the document. Alternatively, if he chose to
produce the item, it could then be offered by the government as evidence
against him.' 3 Pursuant to the statute, the defendant had been ordered to
produce a certain invoice covering imported goods.
The specific holding of Boyd, beyond the declaration itself that certain
sections of the statute were unconstitutional, is difficult to determine, as the
Court relied upon both the fourth and fifth amendments in its ruling."4 The
importance of the Boyd decision for this analysis, however, is not the deci-
sion's precise constitutional basis, but rather the direct link found in the
Court's logic between the need to protect privacy rights and the exclusion of
issue. The court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or
unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to determine that question.
Id. at 337-38. Accord, Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In deciding Boyd, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the En-
glish case of Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), where the plaintiff was
successful in quashing a warrant whose object was the seizure of the plaintiffs private papers for
use in a criminal proceeding against him.
12. An Act to amend the customs-revenue laws and to repeal moieties, ch. 391, § 12, 18
Stat. 186 (1874).
13. 116 U.S. at 619-20. Although Boyd was not per se a criminal case (as already indicated,
it involved a civil forfeiture proceeding), the Court applied the fourth and fifth amendments,
reasoning that suits for penalties and forfeitures were quasi-criminal in nature and consequently
fell within the ambit of the amendments' protections. Id. at 634.
14. Id. at 634-35. In the Court's terms,
a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods
sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against
himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; and is the
equivalent of a search and seizure, and an unreasonable search and seizure, within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. It should be noted that Justice Bradley's theory about the relationship between the fourth
and fifth amendments has not survived. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the
Court held that the fifth amendment did not prohibit enforcement of an Internal Revenue
Service summons against a taxpayer's attorney ordering him to produce an accountant's work
papers transferred to the attorney by the taxpayer. In reaching its decision, the Court agreed
that if the work papers had been privileged in the hands of the taxpayer, the privilege would
not have been lost merely because the taxpayer transferred them to his attorney. The attorney-
client privilege would preclude such a result. The Court therefore had to determine whether
the papers would have been privileged against production in the hands of the taxpayer, and
resolved the issue in the negative.
A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an accountant's work-
papers in his possession without a doubt involves substantial compulsion. But it
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evidence to vindicate those rights. According to Justice Bradley, mere
physical invasion of a defendant's home and personal effects is not the grava-
men of the violation, but rather "the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense." 5  The
Boyd decision thus laid the groundwork for a justificatory rationale for ex-
cluding evidence that focused on vindication of a litigant's individual rights.
This rationale regards the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained as inex-
tricably bound up with the substance of the constitutional guarantees them-
selves. Focusing on the actual victims of unlawful governmental intrusions,
it suggests that these individuals have a personal right under the Constitu-
tion to exclude the fruits of privacy invasions from legal proceedings.
The clearest statements espousing the rationale of individual privacy can
be found in the seminal cases of Weeks v. United States'" and Mapp v.
Ohio.'7 In the Weeks decision, the Supreme Court clarified the param-
eters of the privacy right espoused in Boyd when it held for the first time
that items seized by federal officers, as a result of unconstitutional searches
under the fourth amendment, could not be used as evidence against defend-
ants in federal criminal trials."s Justice Day made it unequivocally clear in
Weeks that it was precisely to redress the victim's invasion of privacy that
the evidence must be excluded. 9  Likewise, in Mapp-the landmark case
which mandated application of the exclusionary rule in state court
proceedings-the Court's chief concern was to ensure that fourth amend-
ment protections had real substantive import to the actual victims of unlaw-
ful police conduct. According to Justice Clark, who wrote the plurality opin-
ion in Mapp,
the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to
restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought. There-
fore, the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers
on their face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person
only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial com-
munications .... [And] [tihe accountant's workpapers are not the taxpayer's.
Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
15. 116 U.S. at 630.
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. 232 U.S. at 393.
19. Id. The Court stated:
If the letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evi-
dence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment declaring his right to be secure against such seizures is of no value, and, so




namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced
to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment .... ..
• . .Our decision . . . gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him ....
Unlike the deterrence rationale, which, as seen below, focuses on the
future, the theory of individual privacy dwells on the present and the im-
mediate past. It posits that the initial intrusive illegality continues to operate
as an invasion of the victim's privacy unless evidential significance is refused
to the objects seized. Indeed, according to the Weeks decision, the improp-
erly seized objects themselves must be returned to the claimant lest he suf-
fer an ongoing abridgement of his constitutional rights.2
The idea that an exclusionary rule of evidence is constitutionally mandated
to vindicate the rights of the victims of privacy invasions reached its apex in
the Mapp decision. As will be seen shortly, however, it has been all but
abandoned by the current Court as a ratio decidendi in exclusionary rule
decisions.
PRESERVING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
Unlike the rationale of individual privacy, which focuses directly on the
victims of unlawful governmental intrusions, and unlike the deterrence
rationale, which aims at future encounters between citizens and law enforce-
ment personnel, the rationale of judicial integrity articulates institutional
concerns of the judiciary. Under this theory, the exclusionary rule is seen as
necessary to prevent judicial complicity in unconstitutional official conduct.
The theory insists that for the courts to attach evidentiary significance to the
fruits of constitutional violations is a clear abdication of the judiciary's role as
chief protector and guardian of the Constitution.
Although the Boyd decision intimated that institutional considerations
were relevant in the Court's decision to exclude evidence in that case,' the
first clear statement of the rationale of judicial integrity came from the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Day in the Weeks case:
[T]he duty of giving [fourth amendment protections] force and effect is
obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforce-
20. 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)). In Wolf, the Court held
for the first time that the guarantees of the fourth amendment were binding on the states by
way of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court declined to hold in
Wolf, however, that the exclusionary rule was an "explicit requirement" of the fourth amend-
ment.
21. 367 U.S. at 660. The rationale of individual privacy provides the strongest argument for
those who insist that the exclusionary rule has a stature of constitutional dimension.
22. 232 U.S. at 398.
23. Mr. Justice Bradley stated in Boyd that compelling evidence from a putative defendant
was inimical to the "principles of a free government" and could not be abided in "the pure
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." 116 U.S. at 632.
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ment of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures .. .should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all
times with the support of the Constitution.
According to this rationale, judicial refusal to condone unlawful conduct
serves notice to law enforcement and public alike that a "manifest neglect, if
not an open defiance," 5 of the Constitution has taken place. Although
zealous efforts to bring the guilty to justice are laudable, such efforts must
not include encroachments on those constitutional protections "established
by years of endeavor and suffering."
In the wake of Weeks, several of our most distinguished Supreme Court
justices have emphasized the importance of judicial integrity as a justification
for the exclusionary rule. A notable example is the passionate statement of
Mr. Justice Brandeis found in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States: "To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution, Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set
its face." '  Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in the same case, was equally
ardent: "We have to choose, and for my part I think it is a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an igno-
ble part." 2"
Proponents of the judicial integrity rationale insist that embodied within it
is more than a mere concern for the appearance of judicial propriety. These
theorists insist that by refusing to countenance unlawful official conduct,
courts shield the individual from overreaching exertions of power by the
executive branch of the government. This belief is rooted in the idea that
the Constitution sets societal priorities, not officialdom. Consequently, the
more zealously those in authority seek to accomplish their objectives, the
more scrupulously must the courts scrutinize their conduct. "Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent," 29 stated Justice Brandeis. "The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning, but without understanding. ' ' 0
The essence of the rationale of judicial integrity, then, is that the exclu-
sionary rule exists to protect the judicial process from unconstitutionally
tainted constituents. This rationale was essential to Justice Clark's plurality
opinion in Mapp,3" as evidenced by his declaration that applying the exclu-
24. 232 U.S. at 392.
25. Id. at 394.
26. Id. at 393.
27. 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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sionary rule to the states accorded the courts "that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice." 32 As with the rationale of
individual privacy discussed previously, however, the rationale of judicial
integrity seems to have been deemphasized in the Court's recent decisions
involving the exclusionary rule.33 The consistency with which this rationale
has been voiced by the Court over the history of the exclusionary rule's
development, and the question of whether the rationale maintains any cur-
rent vitality, are concepts which will be treated in conjunction with analysis
of the deterrence rationale in the following sections.
DETERRING UNLAWFUL POLICE CONDUCT: THE DEMISE OF THE
THEORY OF RIGHTS
The decisional history of the exclusionary rule following Mapp must be
seen as a gradual, yet inexorable movement towards adoption of a good faith
standard to govern application of the rule. To enable it to make what are
seemingly becoming ad hoc determinations of when the rule should be ap-
plied and when not, the Supreme Court has shifted its jurisprudential focus
from one of rights and judicial integrity to one of deterrence. By relegating
the other rationales to positions of relative unimportance, the Court has
undercut the exclusionary rule's constitutional stature, making its application
in particular cases turn on a priori determinations of the rule's efficacy vel
non in shaping future official conduct.
As will be seen, the Court's current analytical modus operandi in exclu-
sionary rule cases is really a rather facile one: deterrence is viewed as the
rule's primary raison d'etre. The need to prevent fourth amendment viola-
tions, although still regarded as important by the Court, is deemed to re-
quire balancing against the social costs of excluding evidence. Further, the
efficacy of the rule in accomplishing its deterrent purpose is seen as suspect,
and, consequently, the Court has found insufficient reason in an increasing
number of cases to invoke application of the rule.m
The seeds of the deterrence rationale were sown by Justice Clark in his
plurality opinion in Mapp.33 But it was in the case of Linkletter v.
Walker,- decided just four years after Mapp, that the deterrence theory
decisively came to the fore. The holding in Linkletter, that the Mapp exclu-
sionary rule was not applicable to "state court convictions which had become
32. Id. at 660.
33. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Powell's opinion for the majority in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 486 (1976) ("rhe primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.").
34. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
35. 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960);
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 152 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
[Vol. 30:51
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final before rendition" of the Mapp decision,37 was premised upon the con-
clusion that the rule's primary purpose was deterrence, and "that this pur-
pose would [not] be advanced by making the rule retrospective." 3 Signifi-
cantly, the Linkletter Court failed to mention the rationale of judicial
integrity 39 and apparently repudiated outright the rationale of individual
privacy. In the Court's view: "[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes
and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late." '40  The logic of
Linkletter is that the rule focuses directly on the rights of individuals not
before the court, and only incidentally on the litigants in whose favor the
exclusion of reliable evidence is grudgingly allowed. Even to Justice Clark,
the unseemly prospect of the "wholesale release of ... guilty victims,""
was too great a social cost to pay for philosophical symmetry in the rule's
application.'
In the year preceding his retirement from the Court, Chief Justice Earl
Warren, writing for the majority in the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, 3
presaged the judicial posture that developed later under the leadership of
Chief Justice Warren Burger. After reiterating the language of Linkletter
that the major thrust of the rule was deterrence, Chief Justice Warren pro-
ceeded to suggest that "in some contexts the rule is ineffective as a
deterrent."4 He noted that confrontations between citizens and law en-
forcement officials occur in a variety of settings and for diverse purposes,
37. Id. at 622. The Court defined the word "final" as follows: "By final we mean where the
judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for
petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Id. at 622 n.5.
38. Id. at 636-37.
39. The Court did refer to "the administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial
process," id. at 63, but its reference was not meant in the conventional sense of those terms
when used in referring to justifications for the exclusionary rule. This interpretation is borne out
by the Court's immediately succeeding explanation:
To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice to
the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long
since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the witnesses available





42. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Linkletter indicated just how asymmetric the result
was:
Linkletter must stay in jail; Miss Mapp, whose offense was committed before Link-
letter's, is free. This different treatment of Miss Mapp and Linkletter points up at
once the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the judicial contrivance utilized here
to break the promise of Mapp by keeping all people in jail who are unfortunate
enough to have had their unconstitutional convictions affirmed before June 19,
1961.
Id. at 641 (Black, J., dissenting).
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
44. Id. at 13.
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some of which have little to do with the desire to gather evidence for future
prosecution of crime.' Furthermore, he questioned whether the exclusion-
ary rule could ever discourage harassment of minority groups, particularly
blacks, by certain elements of the police community.46 In spite of these
limitations, however, the Chief Justice reemphasized that the rule consti-
tuted the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal con-
text and that it also served the vital function of "the imperative of judicial
integrity.""7 He further reassured the lower courts that they still retained
their traditional responsibility to act as guardians against overbearing or
harassing police conduct: "When such conduct is identified, [the exclusion-
ary rule requires that] it must be condemned by the judiciary and its
fruits . . . excluded from evidence in criminal trials.""4 Clearly, then, Chief
Justice Warren did not advocate abandoning the exclusionary rule in the
Terry opinion. Nevertheless, the language of the opinion makes it unmistak-
able that another phase in the rule's history had been inaugurated. Not only
had deterrence co-opted both the individual privacy and judicial integrity
rationales as the primary jurisprudential justification for the rule, but also
the efficacy of the co-opting rationale itself was now being questioned.
Following President Nixon's appointment of Warren E. Burger as Chief
Justice in 1969, three major developments can be seen in the Court's exclu-
sionary rule opinions: (1) a growing propensity of the Court to find that the
harmful consequences of the rule's application outweigh its deterrent
benefits;4 (2) a de-emphasis of the importance of federal judicial review in
the area of fourth amendment rights;5" and (3) the emergence of the view
that only flagrant or willful violations of the fourth amendment should trig-
ger the rule's exclusionary operation.5"
The Burger Court's assault upon the exclusionary rule began with the
Chief Justice's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics."2 Although acknowledging that the "sport-
ing contest" or "judicial integrity" foundation for the rule had been voiced
45. Id. at 13-14.
46. Id. at 14-15.
47. Id. at 12 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
48. Id. at 15.
49. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
50. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
51. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
418 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. Ironically, the holding in Bivens from which the Chief Justice dissented gave a civil
cause of action to victims of fourth amendment violations perpetrated by federal law enforce-
ment officers, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit damage remedy in either the constitu-
tional or congressional enactments. The Chief Justice has long argued that alternatives to the
exclusionary rule should be considered. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 Ami.
U.L. REV. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Watchman]. A tort remedy is certainly one plausible
alternative to the rule; yet, the Chief Justice was against implementation of a tort remedy in
Bivens because of separation of powers considerations: "We would more surely preserve the
important values of the doctrine of separation of powers-and perhaps get a better result-by
recommending a solution to the Congress as the branch of government in which the Constitu-
tion vested the legislative power." 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 30:51
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from time to time in the Court's opinions,' the Chief Justice indicated it
was clear to him that only the deterrence rationale could be said to under-
gird the Court's past decisions.' It was equally clear to him, however, that
the exclusionary rule's history demonstrated that it was "both conceptually
sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective."55
Burger noted that no empirical evidence to support the deterrence justifica-
tion had been forthcoming since the rule was first implemented in Weeks.'
Even more alarming, asserted Justice Burger, was that innocent victims of
unlawful acts-such as the petitioner claimed to be in Bivens-had been
left without an effective remedy in the federal system.,7
The views of Justice Burger set forth in his now famous Bivens dissent
typify those of others who have argued for elimination or modification of the
exclusionary rule. It is not that protection of fourth amendment interests is
deemed unimportant, or that its importance is considered secondary to effi-
cient and effective law enforcement, but rather, that the exclusionary rule is
ineffective in protecting either body of interests. Justice Burger's avowed
support in Bivens for a device to protect privacy interests was as strong as
his criticism of the exclusionary rule's failure to serve such purpose. He
made it quite clear in Bivens that he did not favor abrogating the rule until
an alternative was forthcoming.m
In addition to seriously questioning the exclusionary rule's effectiveness in
deterring unlawful police conduct, Justice Burger articulated another con-
cern, later seized upon and further developed in opinions of the Court,
namely, the distinction between intentional conduct and inadvertant errors
of judgment as the cause of fourth amendment violations.s If the primary
mainstay of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, its purpose, Burger con-
53. 403 U.S. at 413-14. Justice Burger also noted that the rule had once been justified on
the basis that suppression of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was required
because of the relationship between the fourth amendment and the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth. Id. at 414. Unless he meant to include within this theory the whole idea behind the
individual privacy rationale (which, as has already been seen, was emphasized in the early
opinions of the Court), it must be seen as an oversight on his part that this theory is nowhere
mentioned in his opinion.
54. Id. at 415.
55. id.
56. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Justice Burger cited Professor Oaks' study in support of his conclu-
sion that empirical evidence supporting the rule was lacking. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 667 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
57. 403 U.S. at 415-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 415, 420. Chief Justice Burger explained:
I do not question the need for some remedy to give meaning and teeth to the
constitutional guarantees against unlawful conduct by government officials. Without
some effective sanction, these protections would constitute little more than
rhetoric .... I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression doctrine
until some meaningful alternative can be developed.
Id. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (wherein
Burger indicates that his views in this regard may have changed).
59. 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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cluded, is served only indirectly or marginally by excluding evidence de-
rived from the "honest mistakes" and "errors of judgment" which "inevitably
occur under the pressure of police work." ' Accordingly, the rule's lack of
effectiveness in curbing unintentional violations followed because law en-
forcement realities greatly reduced the didactic impact of judicial pronounce-
ments in search and seizure cases.6 In his judgment, many judicial opin-
ions lacked "helpful clarity."" Indeed, if judges and attorneys often differed
sharply over what were or were not "reasonable" modes of conduct under
the fourth amendment, how could police officers be expected to form such
judgments in the pressurized and harried environment of their work?", The
"clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule . . .required to justify it in view of the high price it extract[ed] from
society-the release of countless guilty criminals" was, in Burger's view,
neither present nor possible with unintentional violations. Disturbed that for
over fifty-five years (Bivens was handed down in 1971) the legal system had
adhered to the exclusionary rule, had resisted change, and had refused even
to acknowledge the need for effective protection of fourth amendment rights,
the Chief Justice indicated in Bivens that he would support modifications of
the exclusionary rule along either one or both of the following lines: elimi-
nating the rule altogether as soon as a reasonable alternative was developed
by proper authorities; and restricting the rule's operation of those circum-
stances involving intentional or flagrant police misconduct.63
Since Bivens, the Court has not yet confronted a situation that meets the
requirements of the first approach. Neither the federal nor any state govern-
ment has yet to present an alternative to the rule as part of a request that
the rule not be applied to evidence sought to be used in the case-in-chief of
a criminal trial. Concerning the second line of Burger's criticism, however,
60. Id. Of course it can be argued that excluding the fruits of even innocent mistakes will
deter future violations, as police will be encouraged to better learn the law. In its extreme, this
argument requires that the exlusionary rule be applied in all cases where a violation is found to
exist, irrespective of the nature of the violation.
61. Id. at 417.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. id. at 416.
65. The Chief Justice also made it quite clear that the "imperative of judicial integrity" did
not present an obstacle to making inroads on the rule, so long as a reasonable alternative were
forthcoming:
[Tlhe exclusionary rule does not ineluctably flow from a desire to insure that gov-
ernment plays the "game" according to the rules. If an effective alternative remedy
is available, concern for official observance of the law does not require adherence to
the exclusionary rule. Nor is it easy to understand how a court can be thought to
endorse a violation of the Fourth Amendment by allowing illegally seized evidence
to be introduced against a defendant if an effective remedy is provided against the
government.
Id. at 414. Similar views to those espoused in the Bivens dissent were set forth by the Chief
Justice in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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four cases handed down during the 1974 and 1975 terms have both re-
stricted the proceedings to which the rule is now applicable and curtailed
the available forums for review of search and seizure questions." And with
rendition of Michigan v. DeFillippol6 in the summer of 1979, it appears that
the Court has taken virtually all but the final step toward adopting a good
faith exclusionary rule standard.
The first of these decisions was United States v. Calandra.' In that case,
Justice Powell, speaking for himself and five other members of the Court,6 9
held that "a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury
[could not] refuse to answer questions on the ground that they [were] based
on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure."'° In reversing
both the federal district and appellate courts, Justice Powell unequivocally
indicated for two-thirds of the Court that the individual privacy rationale
afforded absolutely no justification for imposition of the exclusionary rule.
The Court had already indicated in Linkletter7" that the primary purpose of
the rule was deterrence, and that the "ruptured privacy of the victims'
homes" could not be restored."2 But until Calandra, the Court had never
expressly :ruled out the individual privacy theory as one of the supporting
rationales of the rule, even if only a secondary one. In the words of Justice
Powell, though, "the rule [was] a judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 3 The
Court rejected outright Calandra's agrument that "each and every question
[put to the defendant] based on evidence obtained from an illegal search and
seizure constitutes a fresh and independent violation of the witness' constitu-
tional rights."" In Justice Powell's view, the wrong was fully accomplished
at the time the unlawful intrusion occurred. Questions propounded by the
grand jury could not in any sense be regarded as independent violations.
According to the majority, the issue presented by the use of evidence de-
rived from the initial unlawful intrusion was one of remedies, not of
rights." Calandra's logic strikingly indicates just how far the Court had
departed from the theory posited by Justice Day in Weeks that a failure to
return unconstitutionally seized items constituted a continuing abridgement
of one's constitutional rights.6
66. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Janis v. United States, 428 U.S. 433 (1976);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
67. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
68. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
69. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Black-
mun, and Rehnquist.
70. 414 U.S. at 350.
71. 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
72. 381 U.S. at 637.
73. 414 U.S. at 348.
74. Id. at 353.
75. Id. at 353-54.
76. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
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Once the Court had excluded all considerations but deterrence,17 its deci-
sion in Calandra fell neatly into the analytical construct suggested earlier.
Because the rule is regarded as a judicially created remedy and not a per-
sonal constitutional right, a balancing process must be applied in which the
deterrence goal is weighed against any countervailing considerations in
issue-in this case, the uninterrupted investigatory functioning of the grand
jury."8 Further, the institution of the grand jury, deeply rooted in Anglo-
American history, is an essential aspect of the fifth amendment, and has
traditionally been accorded wide latitude in its inquiries."M Justice Powell
concluded that "any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved
by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best"; °
therefore, the rule was not to be required in grand jury proceedings."
In his dissenting opinion in Calandra, Justice Brennan indicated that the
majority's decision left him with the "uneasy feeling" that the Court had
positioned itself to reopen still further the door once closed in Mapp and
perhaps abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure
cases." According to him, no reason existed to conclude that the deterrence
goal was served by applying the rule to trials, but not to grand jury pro-
ceedings; empirical data supporting such a conclusion was simply lacking.'
The prophetic quality of Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra was to be
borne out in the Court's next major treatment of the rule-United States v.
Peltier. '
The issue addressed by the Court in Peltier was the retroactive effect to
be given to the Court's ruling in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.' The
Court had held in the latter case that a warrantless automobile search, con-
ducted approximately twenty-five air miles from the Mexican border by bor-
der patrol agents acting without probable cause, was unconstitutional under
the fourth amendment.6 Four months before this decision, the defendant
in Peltier was stopped in his automobile." r His car was searched almost
seventy miles from the Mexican border and without probable cause. There
was thus no question that the seizure of Peltier's marijuana was unconstitu-
77. As in the Linkletter case, the Calandra decision made short shrift of the rationale of
judicial integrity. Nowhere was this institutional concern mentioned in the body of the Court's
opinion. In a footnote the Court indicated that it did not see itself as sanctioning illegal conduct
by declining to apply the exclusionary rule to an area in which the deterrence rationale would
not be significantly advanced. 414 U.S. at 355-56 n.il.
78. Id. at 348-49.
79. Id. at 342-43.
80. Id. at 351.
81. Id. at 350.
82. Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
85. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
86. Id.
87. 422 U.S. at 532.
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tional under Almeida-Sanchez.as After a motion to suppress evidence was
denied by the district court, Peltier stipulated in writing to the facts alleged
in the indictment. He was accordingly found guilty, sentence was imposed,
and appeal was then taken."9 The Government conceded that the only issue
to be decided on appeal was the retroactive effect of Almeida-Sanchez. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, re-
versed the district court on the ground that the Almeida-Sanchez decision
"should be applied to similar cases pending on appeal on the date the Su-
preme Court's decision was announced." Thus, on remand to the trial
court, the Ninth Circuit's decision required exclusion of the marijuana
seized from Peltier's automobile. Without the drug there obviously could be
no prosecution-the possessor of 270 pounds of contraband would go free. 9'
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reversed the
Ninth Circuit. The majority held that Almeida-Sanchez was not to be ap-
plied to searches conducted prior to June 21, 1973, the date on which that
case was decided.92 Critical to the Court's opinion was an assessment of the
exclusionary rule's efficacy in deterring fourth amendment violations,' 3 an
analytical calculus, which, as already seen, was paramount in several preced-
ing exclusionary rule cases.4 But the most significant development in the
Peltier decision was the heavy reliance placed upon the mental state of law
enforcement officers in gauging the rule's deterrent effect. In concluding his
opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist posited in sweeping language that
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct
then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can
be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment."
88. Id. at 533.
89. Id. at 532.
90. United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. 422 U.S. at 532.
92. Id. at 534-35.
93. Id. at 539. According to Justice Rehnquist:
Whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied to the roving Border Patrol
search conducted in this case, then, depends on whether considerations of either
judicial integrity or deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations are sufficiently
weighty to require that the evidence obtained by the Border Patrol in this case be
excluded.
Id.
94. See notes 35-83 and accompanying text supra.
95. 422 U.S. at 542. Indeed, the language of Justice Rehnquist was so sweeping, it
prompted these words from Justice Brennan in dissent:
True, the Court does not state in so many words that this formulation of the exclu-
sionary rule is to be applied beyond the present retroactivity context. But the prop-
osition is stated generally and .. .I have no confidence that the new formulation is
to be confined to putative retroactivity cases. Rather, I suspect that when a suitable
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Peltier presented a fact situation ideally suited for application of this men-
tal state analysis. Section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,1 authorized certain officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Di-
vision to search vehicles without a warrant within reasonable distances of
any external boundary of the United States. Pursuant to the statutory au-
thorization, regulations were enacted fixing the "reasonable distance" crite-
rion of section 287(a)(3) at "100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States." 17 Justice Rehnquist noted that between 1952 and the
Court's 1973 decision in Almeida-Sanchez, numerous decisions of the federal
courts of appeals had upheld Almeida-Sanchez type searches against consti-
tutional attack,6 and dicta in decisions of three appellate courts had strongly
suggested that the statute and regulations "were acceptable means for polic-
ing the immigration laws."' In the Court's view, to apply the exclusionary
rule to searches conducted before the Almeida-Sanchez decision would in
substance mean that law enforcement officers could not confidently rely
upon any judicial, legislative, or executive decisions other than those of the
Supreme Court. 10 Because the nature of the constitutional violation in
Almeida-Sanchez did not implicate the truth-finding function of the trial,''
and because no deterrent effect could be attributed to a retroactive applica-
tion of that decision,"' 2 the exclusionary rule was not to be mechanically ap-
plied to preserve doctrinal symmetry alone.' °'
The Calandra and Peltier decisions laid the foundation for a future exten-
sion of the good faith exception to issues other than those involving the
grand jury and retroactivity. They indicate that the second line of Chief
Justice Burger's attack in the Bivens dissent is now firmly grasped and sup-
opportunity arises, today's revision of the exclusionary rule will be pronounced ap-
plicable to all search-and-seizure cases.
Id. at 551-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976).
97. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1973).
98. 422 U.S. at 540 n.8.
99. Id. at 541.
100. Id. at 541-42.
101. Id. at 535.
102. Id. at 542.
103. As in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the actual search challenged in Peltier
occurred subsequent to the search in the case requested to be retroactively applied. Denying
retroactivity thus yields the anomalous result of reversing the earlier decision merely because it
happened to be the one selected by the Supreme Court for review. Such a result obviously
undercuts any notion that the exclusionary rule serves the purpose of protecting or effectuating
the litigant's personal constitutional rights. It also points up the inability of the deterrence
rationale to explain why the exclusionary rule was applied to the decided case in the first place
(here Almeida-Sanchez). For if the rule cannot be regarded as furthering the deterrence
rationale in the Peltier search, a fortiorari, it will not serve to explain its application to searches
antedating the search in Peltier. As indicated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Peltier, strict
application of the deterrence rationale means that Almeida-Sanchez itself was wrongly decided.
422 U.S. at 553-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ported by a majority of the current Court 4-that is, although the rule
should not be entirely eliminated until a reasonable substitute is instituted,
its application should be restricted to those cases in which its remedial
objective -deterrence -is most likely to be served.
DETERRING UNLAWFUL POLICE CONDUCT:
THE DEMISE OF THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
In his dissent in Peltier, Justice Brennan issued the following challenge to
his fellow justices:
If a majority of my colleagues are determined to discard the exclusionary
rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should forthrightly do so, and be
done with it. . . But to attempt covertly the erosion of an important
principle over 61 years in the making as applied in federal courts clearly
demeans the adjudicatory function, and the institutional integrity of this
Court. "
Throughout his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan has remained one of
the exclusionary rule's most passionate supporters. Although his somewhat
bitter insinuation that the Burger Court has disingenuously tortured prece-
dent merits serious consideration, from its very inception the exclusionary
rule has never been applied consistently to support any one of its purported
undergirding rationales. The Burger Court, as opposed to compromising
104. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion for the Court by the Chief Justice, and
Associate Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell. The Chief Justice's views concerning the rela-
tionship between operation of the rule and the mental state of the law enforcement officers has
already been discussed in conjunction with his Bivens dissent. See notes 52-65 and accompany-
ing text supra. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I
venture to predict that overruling this judicially contrived doctrine-or limiting its scope to
egregious, bad-faith conduct-would inspire a surge of activity toward providing some kind of
statutory remedy for persons injured by police mistakes or misconduct."). Justice White's in-
clination toward a "good faith" standard for the exclusionary rule is clearly evidenced in his
concurring opinion in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), a decision which held that the
giving of Miranda warnings did not ipso facto render admissible a confession following an un-
lawful arrest:
Insofar as the Court holds (1) that despite Miranda warnings the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments require the exclusion from evidence of statements obtained as
the fruit of an arrest which the arresting officers knew or should have known was
without probable cause and unconstitutional, and (2) that the statements obtained in
this case were in this category, I am in agreement and therefore concur in the
judgment.
Id. at 606. Also in the Brown decision, Justice Powell rendered a concurring opinion (joined by
Justice Rehnquist) advocating a mental state test in analyzing "dissipation of the taint" inquiries
under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Id. at 608-12. According to Justice Powell, "the
point at which the taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in the absence of
other controlling circumstances, to the nature of that taint." Id. at 609. Flagrantly abusive
violations of the fourth amendment call for the clearest indication of attenuation, id. at 610,
while "technical" violations-such as where officers act in good faith on a warrant later
invalidated-should not trigger exclusion of evidence derived as the fruit thereof. Id. at 611-12.
105. 422 U.S. at 561-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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some historically consistent and inviolate sustaining precedent for the rule,
has continued, for the most part, the process of restricting the rule's applica-
tion to that of excluding evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief in a cri-
minal trial.
Without question, though, as part of this process, the Burger Court has
both clarified and simplified the jurisprudential analysis to be undertaken in
exclusionary rule cases. As has been noted already, the current Court has
explicitly rejected the rationale of individual privacy as a justification for the
rule."" The more interesting jurisprudential development, however, has
attended the rationale of judicial integrity-"the core value [of] the exclu-
sionary rule," 107 according to Justice Brennan. This section will concern pri-
marily that development.
As noted previously, the Calandra decision, which devoted much text to a
discussion of the exclusionary rule's justifications, made no mention of the
concept of judicial integrity in the main body of the majority opinion. The
Court alluded to the idea in a footnote,'m but it was never explicitly evalu-
ated as an independent justification for the rule's imposition. This omission
seemed to deprive the integrity rationale of independent significance. In
three major exclusionary rule decisions following Calandra, however, the
Court once again specifically addressed the institutional concern of judicial
integrity." The majority opinions in these cases indicate quite clearly that
this rationale shadows the deterrence rationale. Absent deterrence, it will
not justify application of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases.
In United States v. Janis, "° Justice Blackmun held for a 5-3 majority of the
Court"' that the exclusionary rule did not require the exclusion in federal
civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by state law enforcement offi-
cials. On the day Janis was handed down, Justice Powell announced the
opinion for a 6-3 majority in Stone v. Powell,"' holding that when a state has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth amendment
claims, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence introduced at trial was obtained through an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure."' Although these decisions no doubt repre-
106. See text accompanying notes 71-103 supra. Indeed, as seen in the recent case of Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court now seems to deny that the individual rights theory
ever was a judicially acknowledged justification for the rule. According to Justice Powell,
"[diecisions prior to Mapp advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal
trials-judicial integrity and deterrence." Id. at 484.
107. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 553 n.13 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. 414 U.S. 338, 355-56 n.ll (1974).
109. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
110. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
111. Justice Blackmun was joined in his majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens abstained.
112. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Justice Powell was joined in his majority opinion by the Chief
Justice, and by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
113. Id. at 494. The holding was clarified in a footnote to the Court's opinion to indicate the
two-step inquiry required by federal district courts:
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sent important developments in the relationship between state and federal
courts and for habeas corpus jurisdiction generally, the primary focus here is
on the role ascribed to the rationale of judicial integrity in these two deci-
sions, as well as in Peltier."'
In Peltier,"' Justice Rehnquist noted for the Court that "[diecisions ...
applying the exclusionary rule to unconstitutionally seized evidence have re-
ferred to 'the imperative of judicial integrity'. . . although the Court has
relied principally upon the deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary
rule." 16 Furthermore, he noted that the rationale of judicial integrity must
be considered along with the deterrence rationale in determining whether
the exclusionary rule should be applied."7 Similarly, in Stone, although ac-
knowledging that prior decisions had alluded to the "imperative of judicial
integrity," Justice Powell stressed that the judicial integrity justification had
played a "limited role ... in the determination whether to apply the rule in
a particular context." "I Emphasizing this point, he noted that if the judicial
integrity rationale were extended to its logical extreme, courts would be
required to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence despite lack of objec-
tion by the defendant, or even in the face of his assent."' In the Janis case,
however, the Supreme Court indicated precisely how limited a role the judi-
cial integrity rationale played in deciding exclusionary rule questions. Justice
Blackmun, the majority spokesman, virtually denuded the "imperative of
judicial integrity" of any independent force in deciding exclusionary rule
cases. In his words, "[tihe primary meaning of 'judicial integrity' in the con-
text of evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage
violations of the Constitution." 0 But because the fourth amendment viola-
tion has already been fully consummated by the time the evidence is pre-
sented to the court, Blackmun reasoned that the court is not participating
directly in that particular violation, or in any other violations for that matter.
According to the Janis logic, judicial involvement in unlawful conduct only
In sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule on
habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the state pris-
oner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and
on direct review. Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdic-
tion over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule is limited to cases in
which there has been both such a showing and a Fourth Amendment violation.
Id. at 494-95 n.37.
114. In all three decisions the Court ultimately relied upon the Calandra cost-benefit analy-
sis in finding in favor of the government. The additional deterrent value of the exclusionary rule
was found to be too marginal and tenuous in these cases to take precedence over the competing
issues. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489, 493 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539, 542 (1975).
115. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
116. Id. at 536.
117. Id. at 539.
118. 428 U.S. at 485.
119. id.
120. 428 U.S. at 458-59 n.35.
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results indirectly; that is, by encouraging future violations of the Constitu-
tion by admitting the fruits of past invasions. Application of the judicial in-
tegrity rationale thus reduces to an evaluation of the same factors relevant to
consideration of the deterrence justification. Consequently, if the deterrence
rationale is not regarded as controlling in a particular exclusionary rule
analysis, it is unlikely that the imperative of judicial integrity will alter the
determination. 121
In the framework of Janis, Stone, and Peltier, current perspectives on the
imperative of judicial integrity must be formulated in light of the Court's
developing propensity to regard good faith on the part of law enforcement
officials as sufficient reason not to apply the exclusionary rule. In all three
cases, the Court emphasized that the officers in question had acted in good
faith, even though their conduct was ultimately found to violate the
Constitution.'2 This theme was established decidedly by Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Peltier which declined to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively:
[I]ntroduction of evidence which [has] been seized by law enforcement
officials in good-faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms
[does] not make the courts "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
Constitution they are sworn to uphold.". . . [T]he "imperative of judicial
integrity" is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that mate-
rial even if decisions subsequent to the search have broadened the exclu-
sionary rule to encompass evidence seized in that manner.'
A consistency pervades the current Court's decisions which its critics, in-
cluding Justice Brennan, may have been all too willing to overlook. If the
exclusionary rule is, after all, a "judicially created remedy" designed to en-
courage compliance with the fourth amendment, and not "an explicit re-
quirement" of the Constitution, there seems to be nothing inherently con-
tradictory in a process of selective application which includes in its calculus
the factor of practical efficacy.' The Burger Court's consideration of utility
121. An "analysis [which shows] that exclusion ... has no demonstrated deterrent effect and
is unlikely to have any significant such effect shows, by the same reasoning, that the admission
of the evidence is unlikely to encourage violations of the Fourth Amendment." id.
122. As indicated previously, Peltier involved a case where officers were relying on regula-
tions promulgated under authority of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Although the Court
found the conduct unreasonable under the fourth amendment and the regulations overly broad,
the situation was certainly a far cry from intentional or flagrant violations of constitutional rights.
In Janis, the state officers were acting pursuant to a warrant later declared invalid, and Justice
Blackmun regarded the officers as thus "clearly acting in good faith." 428 U.S. at 458-59 n.35.
Likewise, in Stone v. Powell (decided concurrently with Wolf v. Rice) the officers involved were
acting in good faith reliance on some kind of prior authorization. In Powell's case, the arrest was
pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutional, but there was no question that the officer
had probable cause to believe Powell had violated the statute. 428 U.S. at 469-71. Similarly, in
Rice, the officers were acting on a warrant later declared to be invalid because of a defective
supporting affidavit. 428 U.S. at 471-74.
123. 422 U.S. at 536, 537.
124. Of course, if the rule is seen as a constitutional right, analogies centered on pragmatism
loose much of their relevancy. Constitutional rights must usually be honored even if societal
interests are compromised. See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable"
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in exclusionary rule cases, and its insistence that a balancing process be
employed in analyzing requested applications of the rule, are not out of line
with pre-Burger Court decisions. Throughout the history of the rule, the
Court has been called upon to balance the benefits potentially derivable
from the rule's application against the attendant compromise of the truth-
seeking process, with the decisions often dismissing the rule.
A case in point is the 1954 decision Walder v. United States,", where the
Court held that illegally seized evidence could be used to impeach a defend-
ant's testimony at trial. Walder was tried for illegal possession of narcotics,
and while on the witness stand, he made the claim that he had never in his
life possessed narcotics." In rebuttal, the trial court permitted the prosecu-
tion to present testimony that on an unrelated prior occasion narcotics had
been found in the defendant's possession, even though, admittedly, the im-
peaching evidence had been unlawfully obtained. 27 Writing for the Court,
Justice Frankfurter stated that "[i]t is one thing to say that the Government
cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite
another to say that the defendant can turn [the exclusionary rule] to his own
advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths."' Similarly, in Burdeau v. McDowell," the Court held that evi-
dence unlawfully obtained from an accused by a private person was admissi-
ble in a criminal trial. Because the fourth amendment proscribed official
intrusions and not private ones, the exclusionary rule was found to be inap-
plicable, considerations of judicial integrity notwithstanding."3 Further, in
Frisbie v. Collins,3' the Court held that an illegal arrest (or, in the case of
Collins, an illegal forcible abduction) did not in itself require release of a
defendant's person and abatement of judicial proceedings, as long as the
defendant was fairly apprised of the pending charge and accorded a fair trial,
satisfying all constitutional safeguards." 32 Perhaps the most significant of all
exceptions to application of the exclusionary rule is the requirement that the
person requesting suppression of evidence have "standing" to do so-that
is, "that he himself [be] the victim of an invasion of privacy.""
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CruM. L. 635, 654 (1978). See Justice Brennan's
dissent in Stone v. Powell which vehemently argues that admission of illegally seized evidence
in a criminal trial violates the Constitution. 428 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
126. Id. at 63-64.
127. Id. at 64.
128. Id. at 65. Cf. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (statements made by a
defendant in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's
direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by
evidence that has been illegally obtained and is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda admissible
for purposes of impeachment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained
without first giving Miranda warnings admissible for impeachment).
129. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
130. Id. at 475.
131. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
132. Id. at 522-23.
133. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
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All these exceptions were fully developed long before 1969, and, indeed,
before the Mapp decision itself. In each, the Court allowed unlawfully
seized evidence to be used in a criminal trial (in the Frisbie case, an unlaw-
fully seized defendant), notwithstanding institutional concerns of judicial in-
tegrity or the constitutional rights of the victims themselves. Neither of
these rationales has ever been regarded as sacrosanct. A balancing process
has always been at work, with the rule yielding when countervailing consid-
erations were found to outweigh the incremental protection of fourth amend-
ment interests gained by application of the rule.
As seen before, the deterrence rationale-now regarded as the primary
justification for the rule-does not require application of the exclusionary
rule whenever some incremental deterrent effect might result. On the con-
trary, balancing takes place, and the above examples apply with equal force
in demonstrating that considerations of deterrence have never foreclosed
analysis of the rule's effect on other societal interests. Certainly, refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule when its proponent lacks "standing" is not a case
in which deterrence would only marginally result. Technical considerations
such as standing simply have no place in gauging whether the exclusionary
rule will deter fourth amendment violations. Consequently, if the Court has
declined to apply the rule because of the absence of standing, factors other
than deterrence must be held responsible."
MICHIGAN v. DEFILLIPPO
A RECENT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Controversy has been the distinguishing characteristic of the exclusionary
rule's sixty-seven year history. In the earlier exclusionary rule cases, the
In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the "'standing" rubric should be abandoned, arguing
that the principles traditionally treated under the standing requirement could more properly be
subsumed under substantive fourth amendment doctrine. The issues, however, were the same:
"[F]irst, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged 'injury in fact,' and,
second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing
his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties." Id. at 139. See also Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
134. Noteworthy is the statement of Justice White for the Court in Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969):
[W]e think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between pre-
venting the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally seized
from him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim this
predicate for exclusion .... [Our cases do not] hold that anything which deters
illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment. The deterrent
values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated
have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence
even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. . . .But we
are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to
other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.
Id. at 174-75.
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debate dwelled on the rule's claim to constitutional legitimacy. Recently,
however, the polemics have centered on efficacy, with the Court focusing its
inquiry on whether the deterrent purpose would be advanced by applying
the rule in particular settings. By relegating considerations of judicial in-
tegrity to relative unimportance, and by repudiating the individual privacy
concept as a justification for the rule, the Court is positioned to refuse ap-
plication of the rule on a case-by-case basis whenever it determines that
other interests outweigh deterrence.
The emergence of a good faith standard to govern the exclusionary rule's
application is the logical outgrowth of the jurisprudential shifts discussed at
length above. The good faith standard not only accommodates the current
Court's emphasis on deterrence, but also affords the Court a decisional
framework within which it can avoid application of the rule when its in-
terests balancing requires, while at the same time leaving fourth amendment
substantive protections intact.
The reluctance of the Court to require exclusion of evidence when the
violation is perpetrated in good faith is illustrated by the recent case of
Michigan v. DeFillippo. ' Indeed, a close examination of the majority's opin-
ion in that case reveals that it was only by both manipulating precedent and
employing convoluted logic that the Court could reach its desired result,
and yet still not explicitly adopt a good faith standard.
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. City of Detroit police
officers on routine patrol received a radio call to investigate two persons who
were reportedly intoxicated in an alley. ' When they arrived, the officers
found the defendant and a lady companion who was in the process of lower-
ing her slacks.137 An existing City of Detroit ordinance allowed a police offi-
cer to stop and question an individual whose behavior, the officer had
reasonable cause to believe, warranted further investigation for criminal
activity. 38 This ordinance provided that it was unlawful for any person
stopped to refuse to identify himself or herself and produce identification.'39
When the defendant failed to identify himself to the officers' satisfaction, he
was arrested and then searched.' A controlled substance was found on the
defendant's person, and he was subsequently prosecuted for its possession.''
At his preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial
court denied the motion.' In an interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of
Appeals reversed, ruling that the ordinance in question was unconstitution-
ally vague, and that therefore any arrest effected under its authority was
135. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).









unlawful.11 After the Supreme Court of Michigan denied leave to appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the holding of
the Michigan Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, the correctness of the lower
court's holding that the ordinance in question was unconstitutional."' Never-
theless, it proceeded to rule that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on an
ordinance, which at the time had not yet been declared unconstitutional, is
valid regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitu-
tionality. Consequently, the Court determined that the exclusionary rule
was improperly invoked by the Michigan Court of Appeals to suppress the
evidence seized from the defendant.45
The DeFillippo case represents a marked departure from prior holdings of
the Court. In a long line of cases beginning with Berger v. New York,"6 the
Court had consistently declared that searches carried out pursuant to uncon-
stitutional statutes were unlawful irrespective of the fact that the statutes
had not yet been declared unconstitutional at the time of the searches. 4 7 -But
ignoring for the moment differences in ideological preference and concerns
about stare decisis, the DeFillippo case remains disturbing in a much more
basic sense. The logic of the majority indicates just to what degree the Court
is willing to compromise sound reasoning to avoid application of the exclu-
sionary rule in a criminal case. The Court found the arrest in DeFillippo to
be lawful not because it was executed in accordance with fourth amendment
requirements, but rather because it was carried out in good-faith reliance on
prior state legislative action. The case represents a notorious example by
which two constitutionally infirm actions-one by the governing municipal
body in enacting the statute, and the other by the officers in carrying out
the arrest pursuant to it-somehow produce a constitutionally permissible
result. It was the clear thrust of the Court's reasoning that had the arrest not
been carried out pursuant to the municipal ordinance's authority, it would
have been deemed unlawful. It would then have triggered the exclusionary
rule to suppress the fruits of the search.
This questionable, bootstrapping logic must be disturbing to all those who
look to our highest court for cogent elaboration of constitutional doctrine.
And the real culprit behind decisions such as DeFillippo is the exclusionary
rule itself-its continuing existence in its present form. In each fourth
amendment case, the Court finds itself time and again impaled upon the
horns of the same dilemma: whether to abandon or modify the exclusionary
rule and thus overturn years of constitutional precedent or whether to ex-
clude from the trier of fact evidence admittedly of palpable reliability. Un-
143. id.
144. Id. at 35.
145. Id. at 39-40.
146. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
147. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967).
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able to confront this dilemma head-on, the Court has been forced into a
series of compromises in which it has either restricted the cases to which the
exclusionary rule is applied or redefined the rights that the rule itself is
designed to protect. When the former compromise occurs, real problems of
stare decisis and logic result: DeFillippo is a prime example. In the latter
situations, the results are even more troublesome: the exclusionary rule re-
mains intact, but substantive fourth amendment protections are retrenched.
The next part of this Article explores whether this latter phenomenon has
played a role in recent fourth amendment decisions. It should be noted at
this juncture, however, that the Court's ambivalent attitude about the effi-
cacy of the deterrence rationale raises serious doubt whether the exclusion-
ary rule has advanced either the enforcement or liberal interpretation of
fourth amendment interests.
II. THE CASE AGAINST THE PRESENT RULE
Myriad articles have already discussed the exclusionary rule's shortcom-
ings. Distilled to their essence, the arguments presented can be grouped
into three major categories: (a) that the rule does not significantly deter
fourth amendment violations; (b) that it does not adequately repair those
violations that have occurred; and (c) that it impedes effective law enforce-
ment and judicial administration. The following sections touch briefly on
these major criticisms. If the exclusionary rule in its present form proves to
serve any of these three interests adequately, it might well be worth pre-
serving. But, as will be seen, any such demonstration is simply not possible.
A fourth critical area of inquiry, however, is often overlooked by both
proponents and opponents of the exclusionary rule alike. This fourth area
concerns the threat posed to a liberal interpretation of substantive fourth
amendment interests by the exclusionary rule's very existence. Although the
debate surrounding the rule has always been spirited, both sides have un-
swervingly regarded the protection of privacy interests purportedly vouch-
safed by the fourth amendment as the desideratum. Yet, a necessary ques-
tion goes unasked: Does the exclusionary rule in actual operation promote
the liberal interpretation and enforcement of fourth amendment interests?
This part is largely devoted to an evaluation of the rule's effect on the sub-
stantive development of the fourth amendment itself, lest the most insidious
result of all be overlooked-the erosion of fourth amendment interests at
the very hand of its purported chief protector.
THE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE
All statistical studies conducted to measure the deterrent efficacy of the
exclusionary rule have proved inconclusive. "' The absence of empirical evi-
dence, however, is not fatal in evaluating the deterrent impact of the rule
148. In recent years, attempts have been made to measure empirically whether the deterrent
purpose of the rule has any claim to validity. See Oaks, supra note 56; Canon, Is the Exclusion-
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because many of the rule's failures (or inadequacies) can be readily discerned
through a conceptual analysis of the rule itself.
The exclusionary rule, because it is after all a mere rule of evidence, only
operates when gathering evidence for trial motivates police conduct.'19 Be-
cause the great majority of police interventions are not for the purpose of
gathering evidence, but rather to serve the peace-keeping function, I" it is
difficult to comprehend how the exclusionary rule can appreciably deter
fourth amendment violations. Law enforcement officers may ordinarily com-
ply with the fourth amendment in these peace-keeping situations, but if they
do so, other factors must be at work.
As already indicated, certain of the current Supreme Court justices have
stressed that the alleged deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule can only
operate when police officers know the specific rules they must obey. Thus,
the argument is made that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when
an officer has acted in good faith. If the main purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter-as the current Court has ruled-the good faith exception
has merit, provided that the definition of good faith includes an objective as
well as a subjective standard so as to avoid rewarding a state of contrived
ignorance on the part of the police. But a more subtle aspect of the mental
state-deterrent effect calculus is often overlooked. Even if the officer has full
knowledge of both the specific fourth amendment requirements and the con-
sequences flowing from their breach, the deterrent effect will not operate if
he or she chooses to break the law and then prevaricate at the suppression
hearing to avoid exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained. And if officers
acting in concert decide to gather evidence by violating a specific rule, it
strains credibility to suppose that these same officers will later admit their
illegal acts and risk untoward civil and disciplinary consequences. 5' Thus,
even when police act to gather evidence, the exclusionary rule cannot realis-
tically be expected to effectively deter willful violations of the Constitution.
ary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62
Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEC. STUD. 243 (1973); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical
Evaluation of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v.
Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740 (1974). The Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976), summarized these studies as follows: "The final conclusion is clear. No empirical re-
searcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance
whether the rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is now applied." Id. at
452 n.22.
149. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, chs.
21-24 (1965); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 45, 54-55.
150. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1970).
151. See Oaks, supra note 56, at 741-42. For other studies on the subject of police perjury
and the exclusionary rule, see J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 214-15 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SKOLNICK]; Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure
Dead?, 3 TRIAL No. 5, at 41 (August/September 1967).
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A second reason the exclusionary rule fails to deter fourth amendment
violations is that it works no direct penalty on the offending officer. The
immediate effects of excluding evidence fall upon the criminal defendant and
the prosecuting attorney. And even when prosecuting officials attempt to
fault the police officers, the result likely will be commiseration among the
offending officers and their colleagues, rather than a recognition that a
wrong has taken place. The psychology behind police decisions is simply a
far cry from that of the courts in interpreting the fourth amendment. This
disparity exists because the "norms located within [a] police organization are
more powerful than court decisions in shaping police behavior." "' Policemen
and women lack sufficient training to appreciate the jurisprudential consid-
erations behind the exclusionary rule and instead view it-like many
citizens-as an impediment to effective enforcement of criminal laws. This
commonly held view helps explain why offending officers are seldom disci-
plined by their departments for failing to observe fourth amendment
requirements.' A police officer will usually be disciplined only if his or her
conduct deviates from departmental as opposed to judicial expectations."
It might be asking too much to expect police officers to grasp and apply
the intricate rules of search and seizure in the often unpredictable and
pressurized course of everyday police work. As noted above," attorneys and
judges themselves often vehemently disagree over what is or is not a reason-
able intrusion under the fourth amendment. The established system, with a
certain hypocrisy, makes the individual police officer the immediate butt of
controversial decisions that delimit the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tions. It is not difficult to understand why policemen often resent judicial
officials who second guess their firing line decisions from sterile and isolated
152. SKOLNICK, supra note 151, at 219.
153. Additionally, for the exclusionary rule to operate as an effective deterrent, the particular
rules the police are expected to follow need to be both explicitly formulated and effectively
communicated. Unfortunately, these two prerequisites to effective deterrence are probably
nonexistent. As noted by Wayne R. LaFave and Frank J. Remington,
[Plolice [are not) well informed about the trial judge's decision or its legal basis.
The trial judge seldom explains his decision in a way likely to be understood by the
police officer, and the prosecutor assigned to the case rarely assumes it to be his
duty to inform the police department of the meaning of the decision or of its in-
tended impact upon current police practice. The individual officer whose case has
been lost is not expected to report the reason for the decision to his superiors.
Some decisions, usually those the officer believes to be particularly outrageous, may
be passed on to other officers by word of mouth, but they often become distorted in
the retelling. If a "court officer" is assigned to the court by the police department,
his responsibilities do not include reporting the judge's rulings on police conduct.
Obviously, police cannot be affirmatively influenced to change their methods of law
enforcement by the exclusion of evidence when there is no communication to them
of why the decision was made.
LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1005 (1965) (footnote omitted).
154. See Oaks, supra note 56, at 219.
155. See notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text supra.
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courtrooms. In short, because the exclusionary rule cannot effectively deter
willful violations of the fourth amendment, because it does not reach non-
evidence gathering police activities, and because it fails to impose direct
penalties on offending officers, its deterrence effect is at least tenuous.
INADEQUATE REMEDIAL IMPACT
Since the exclusionary rule can only operate to suppress evidence, it fol-
lows that the rule offers no direct protection to innocent victims of unlawful
searches. The rule directly benefits only the guilty. Proponents of the rule
have argued that this criticism is shortsighted; they insist that it fails to
consider that innocent persons do benefit from the rule in futuro as a result
of releasing guilty persons in praesenti. But as one author has correctly
noted, this contention is the "deterrent argument all over again.""
A more sophisticated challenge to the "protects only the guilty" argument
is that "at least the rule protects someone"; consequently, if it does have
shortcomings, the call must be for supplementation, not abandonment.""
This second argument is more difficult to dismiss. Premised on the convic-
tion that even the guilty should be afforded due process of law, the argu-
ment does not depend for its support upon conjecture or design, as does the
deterrence argument. One need only witness the number of cases dismissed
after rulings for the defense on motions to suppress to appreciate that the
effects are real and palpable. The argument that "at least the rule protects
someone" can only be answered by acknowledging from the outset that de-
vising a system of constraints to accommodate all interests-deterrence,
reparation, and effective law enforcement-requires that a balance be struck
among the interests themselves. Tradeoffs are simply inescapable. The cur-
rent Court has rejected outright the idea that the exclusionary rule exists to
vindicate interests of individual privacy.' This same fate has befallen the
idea that judicial acceptance of the unconstitutionally seized evidence consti-
tutes a continuation of the initial illegality. The Court made it clear in
United States v. Calandra " that the violation is complete at the conclusion
of the seizure. If the exclusionary rule in its present form is salvageable as
part of fourth amendment jurisprudence, its benefits must be shown to out-
weigh its adverse effects on the criminal justice system. Additionally, it must
be demonstrated that a substitute remedy more compatible with law en-
forcement needs cannot be devised. The final part of this Article discusses
the wisdom of excluding evidence to redress good faith violations of indi-
vidual privacy. First, however, some other asserted shortcomings of the rule
must be addressed.
156. Wilkey, The exclusionary rule: why suppress valid evidence?: 62 JUD. 214, 223 (1978).
157. See Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alterna-
tives, 1975 WASH. U. L.J. 621, 681. Geller suggests that to protect the innocent, an effective
tort or other remedy may be required.
158. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
159. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1978).
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ADVERSE EFFECTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
The major systemic criticism of the exclusionary rule is that society pays
too exorbitant a price-the release of countless guilty defendants-for the
questionable benefits received. This argument has appeared repeatedly dur-
ing the rule's history and need not be treated further here."6° There are
other systemic criticisms, however, which deserve mention.
Many who argue for the present exclusionary rule insist that the use of
unlawfully obtained evidence breeds contempt for the judicial system. 6' The
exact opposite is more probably true; the rule itself breeds disrespect.
Because few citizens can be expected to understand and appreciate the
rule's jurisprudential underpinnings, the public at large perceives a tech-
nicality-ridden judicial system that rewards cleverness and duplicity at the
expense of safe streets and criminal justice. Chief Justice Burger has mir-
rored this perception in his influential criticisms of the rule.
The operation of the Suppression Doctrine unhappily brings to the public
gaze a spectacle repugnant to all decent people-the frustration of
justice .... If a majority-or even a substantial minority-of the people
in any given community . . . come to believe that law enforcement is
being frustrated by what laymen call "technicalities," there develops a
sour and bitter feeling that is psychologically and sociologically
unhealthy .... [W]e may have come the full circle from the place where
Brandeis stood, and . . . a vast number of people . . . [may be] losing
respect for law and the administration of justice because they think that
the Suppression Doctrine is defeating justice. 62
Another systemic drawback of the rule is that it misdirects the focus of a
criminal proceeding from the guilt or innocence of the defendant to the
160. Judge Friendly has used the disproportionality argument in answer to those who insist
that the rationale of individual privacy justifies the existence of the rule. He points out that the
rule cannot be regarded as a vindication of rights of individual privacy because the dismissal of a
criminal case (the benefit) is totally disproportionate with the wrong suffered. See Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 951 (1965). Another
author has utilized the disproportionality argument to answer the judicial integrity challenge.
"Indeed, this lack of proportionality demonstrates why the exclusionary rule cannot be justified
as a moral imperative preventing the courts from soiling themselves with tainted evidence."
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (1974).
161. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 255
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen]. Professor Paulsen has placed significant emphasis on this
argument.
Few things are more subversive of free institutions than a mistrust of official integ-
rity. When the police themselves break the law and other agencies of government
eagerly reach for the benefits which flow from the breach, it is difficult for the
citizenry to believe that the government truly meant to forbid the conduct in the
first place.
Id. at 258.
162. Watchman, supra note 52, at 12, 22 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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conduct of the police." Some argue that "a criminal prosecution of one per-
son is . . . an indirect and awkward forum for inquiring into the behavior of
some other person, a police officer, with a view to punishing him or creating
some deterrent against similar conduct in the future.""' Suppression hear-
ings often become hotly contested adversary proceedings without the benefit
of the "time-honored method of direct complaint and trial on a carefully
defined issue." '6
A cognate, although more serious institutional shortcoming of the rule, is
its distortion of the fact-finding process. In many criminal trials, the resolu-
tion of the motion to suppress is dispositive of the entire case: a decision in
favor of the defendant means the state will not be able to make out a prima
facie case, while a decision for the state makes plea bargaining a near cer-
tainty. In some cases when evidence is suppressed, however, the case is
nevertheless tried; but the jury must decide guilt or innocence without the
advantage of crucial evidence. Considering the time most juries take to
reach verdicts, much mental anguish undoubtedly inheres in the decision-
making process. The exclusion of reliable evidence only exacerbates this
situation. It seems fundamentally unfair to require juries to discharge socie-
ty's most crucial decision-making function without the benefit of admittedly
reliable evidence.
The rule has also been criticized for its potential to induce or facilitate
corrupt police practices. The rule invests unscrupulous police officers with
the power to immunize criminals by intentionally violating the law in obtain-
ing evidence. 6' Similarly, even if the initial search and seizure are con-
ducted properly, the exclusionary rule facilitates collusion between police
officers and unethical defense lawyers, resulting in the intentional distortion
of facts at suppression hearings to obtain exclusion of crucial evidence.
Under either scenario, the result is the same-justice is thwarted.
The exclusionary rule can also be cited as a reason why police officers
occasionally take the law into their own hands. Frustrated because in their
minds the rule unfairly compromises law enforcement, and incensed at the
release of criminals despite ample evidence of guilt, police sometimes resort
to extra-legal punishments. Suspects may be searched without legal cause for
purposes of harrassment; and if contraband is found, it is confiscated,
although no formal prosecution is ever commenced.
Finally, it is probable that the very existence of the rule itself impedes the
development of more salutary alternatives. As Professor Oaks has noted,
163. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMOHE, EVIDENCE § 2184a, at 51, 52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Barrett,
Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF.
L. REV. 565, 591 (1955).
164. Oaks, supra note 56, at 743.
165. Paulsen, supra note 161, at 256.
166. Justice Cardozo made this argument in the case of People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23,
150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926): "The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power, through
overzeal or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious."
See Paulsen, supra note 161, at 257.
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[t]he enormous concentration and reliance upon the exclusionary rule may
forestall the development of alternative mechanisms for controlling im-
proper behavior by the police. By a peculiar form of federal preemption,
the Mapp decision may sap state officials' energy and determination to
control law enforcement officials in alternative ways that might prove just
as effective and even more comprehensive than the exclusionary rule." 7
EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERESTS
In Terry v. Ohio,"M Chief Justice Warren indicated that, for him, consid-
eration of whether police conduct comported with fourth amendment re-
quirements was virtually inseparable from an analysis of the exclusionary
rule itself: "[Tlhe issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct,
but the admissibility of the evidence uncovered by the search and
seizure. . . . [A]dmitting evidence . . . has the necessary effect of legitimiz-
ing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the
exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur." 169 But should de-
cisions made by our highest Court about matters of prodigious importance to
the delicate relationship between the state and its citizens depend for their
resolution on collateral concerns such as the exclusionary rule? Whether the
exclusionary rule is viewed as a constitutional right or as merely a judicially
created prophylactic remedy (as seems to be the current view), elaborating
substantive fourth amendment doctrine should ideally have nothing to do
with the evidentiary results that attend individual rulings. To consider the
rule's exclusionary effects at all in deciding substantive fourth amendment
questions seems to subvert the very reason for the rule's existence in the
first instance. The exclusion of evidence should only follow a dispassionate
determination of what the Constitution protects. If, however, the remedy
itself is considered in defining the very body of rights it ultimately will be
called upon to protect, and if the decision makers view the remedy as both
inflexible and undesirable, all dispassion vanishes. In such a judicial atmos-
phere, courts will certainly lean, consciously or unconsciously, toward ma-
nipulation of theory and fact to avoid disfavored results.
The difficulty posed by the exclusionary rule for fourth amendment con-
struction finds an analogue in Blackstone's discussion of the nature of crimes
and their punishment. Blackstone noted that unreasonably severe punish-
ments less effectively prevent crimes than punishments tailored to the
malignity of the conduct. 7 ° According to Blackstone, if the punishment for a
particular crime is excessively severe, "the public will out of humanity pre-
fer impunity to it."7 He illustrates this tendency by noting that capital
167. Oaks, supra note 56, at 753.
168. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
169. id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
170. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 14-17 (Beacon Series 1962).
171. Id. at 15.
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punishment was once frequently meted out as the penalty for crimes in Eng-
land. Paradoxically, the result was to increase rather than diminish the num-
ber of offenders because
[t]he injured, through compassion, often forbore to prosecute; juries,
through compassion, sometimes forgot their oaths, and either acquitted
the guilty or mitigated the nature of the offence; and judges, through com-
passion, respited one half of the convicts, and recommended them to the
royal mercy. Among so many chances of escaping, the needy and hard-
ened offender overlooked the multitude that suffered; he boldly engaged
in some desperate attempt, to relieve his wants or supply his vices; and, if
unexpectedly the hand of justice overtook him, he deemed himself pecu-
liarly unfortunate, in falling at last a sacrifice to those laws, which long
impunity had taught him to contemn.'
When decision makers are faced with the prospect of imposing what they
feel is an unjust or excessive penalty, they will tend either to find that thd
facts triggering that penalty do not exist, or to interpret governing law to
circumvent the penalty's applicability. When the end result is automatic and
excessive, and the facts are clear, that result can only be avoided by com-
promising the rules.'
When one considers a majority of the current Court maintains an avowed
antipathy toward the exclusionary rule, one must seriously consider whether
a similar interpretative phenomenon has occurred with respect to the rule.
Chief Justice Burger has labeled the exclusionary rule a "Draconian, discre-
dited device""14 and an "extraordinary remedy." 115 Justice Powell has de-
scribed it as a "judicially created remedy" whose "[a]pplication . . . deflects
the truth-finding process and often frees the guilty."' Justice White has
referred to it as a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in many crimi-
nal trials." " Justice Rehnquist has disparagingly dubbed it a mere "court-
made" rule.' And Justice Blackmun has stressed that the rule hampers the
"enforcement of admittedly valid laws, .. . impos[ing] a substantial cost on
the societal interest in law enforcement." " In light of these judicial utter-
ances, restrictive interpretation of substantive fourth amendment principles
to accommodate law enforcement practices and avoid application of the ex-
clusionary rule must be considered a serious possibility.
172. Id. at 17.
173. The exclusionary rule's tendency to bring about the "collateral perverse effect" of dilut-
ing substantive fourth amendment rights has been suggested by other commentators. See, e.g.,
8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2184, at 52 n.44 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Barrett, Personal Rights,
Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46, 55; Kitch, The Supreme
Court's Code of Criminal Procedure; 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 155, 157-72.
174. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
175. Id. at 501.
176. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
177. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
178. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975).
179. Unitd States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1976).
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The legitimacy of this concern for substantive principles can be tested in
the following five areas of fourth amendment doctrine: automobile searches;
stop and frisk encounters; consent searches; searches incident to arrest; and
privacy interests."m In each area, the same question must be asked: Would
the development likely have been different if the decisional process had not
necessarily required the conferring of a "constitutional imprimatur" 1 on the
police conduct in question to avoid application of the exclusionary rule?
Stated another way, if the Court had been allowed in each of the cases to
consider "the abstract propriety of the police conduct," " would its decisions
likely have been more deferential to fourth amendment interests? An
affirmative answer to this inquiry would certainly deal a mortal blow to the
argument that the exclusionary rule is needed to protect the fourth amend-
ment.
180. In treating this material it would be remiss not to mention that in two areas of fourth
amendment doctrine the Supreme Court has held fast to traditional principles. The Court has
refused to excuse the warrant requirement in the area of administrative searches, and has thus
adhered to the holding of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, it was
stated that warrantless searches of buildings to enforce fire, health, and building codes were
violations of the fourth amendment. The Court indicated, however, that the "probable cause"
requirement to secure a warrant could appropriately be met by reference to traditional adminis-
trative rather than criminal standards. Id. at 538-39. Accord, Lee v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967) (Camara's standards applied to inspections of commercial structures not used as
private residences).
Similarly, the Supreme Court recently held that administrative search standards govern sub-
sequent entries to private property to investigate for possible arson after the initial entry to
fight the fire and the initial investigation have concluded. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978). In addition, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Court held unconsti-
tutional a provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act which authorized agents of the
Secretary of Labor to inspect work areas for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations
without a search warrant or comparable process. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)
(murder-scene exception to fourth amendment warrant requirements not recognized).
The second area in which the current Court has inclined to adhere to traditional principles
relates to border searches. As previously noted, the Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973), refused to sanction an automobile search conducted 25 miles from the
Mexican border by a "roving patrol" absent probable cause or consent. The Court refused to
regard the search in Almeida-Sanchez as a routine border search. Accord, United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (consent or probable cause required for search of private automobiles
at traffic checkpoints removed from rational border). Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975) (brief stops at permanent checkpoint away from border in absence of "'reason-
able suspicion" required for roving patrols upheld).
More recently, in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), the Court applied the
border exception to the fourth amendment in upholding a federal statute which authorized
customs officials to search incoming international mail upon "reasonable cause to suspect" that it
contains illegally imported matter. In sum, these cases indicate that the Court has generally
declined to expand the "border exception" to cover official intrusions occurring in non-border
like settings. In deciding these cases, however, the Court has not expanded a field of fourth
amendment protections which are applicable to the criminal law generally.
181. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
182. Id. at 12.
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Automobile Searches
Since Carroll v. United States " was decided in 1925, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the mobile nature of the object to be searched some-
times renders it impracticable to secure a warrant. Chief Justice Taft empha-
sized that a "vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought." "u Consequently, the fourth amend-
ment necessarily required that a difference be recognized "between a search
of a store, dwelling house, or other structure . . . and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon, or automobile." ... The Court stressed, however, that
"[iln cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must
be used." -
The Court's recent decisions have seized upon the exception recognized in
the Carroll case and have exploded it, thereby allowing warrantless searches
of automobiles in a wide variety of contexts. The Court has indicated in
these cases that the "reasonableness" of a search, and thus its comportment
with fourth amendment requirements, is not always determined by the prac-
ticability of first securing a warrant; ' that citizens have a lesser expectation
of privacy in automobiles than in dwellings; "' and that police "caretaking"
functions can outweigh the interest in protecting privacy when vehicular
searches are at issue. 8
9
The transition in this area of fourth amendment doctrine began in Cham-
bers v. Maroney.95 It was the Court's holding, however, rather than its
reasoning, that marked a significant shift in the philosophy behind auto-
mobile searches. Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that "[f]or
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seiz-
ing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magis-
trate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant."'9 Therefore, under the Carroll doctrine, if the search could have
been made at the scene of the stop without a warrant, it could likewise be
made without prior judicial approval at the police station. Justice White
admitted that, arguably, immobilization of the vehicle until a warrant is se-
cured would constitute a lesser intrusion than searching the vehicle without
prior judicial approval. Because that question was "debatable," however, he
183. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
184. Id. at 153.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 156.
187. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
188. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
189. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). In most of these deci-
sions, it has been justice White who has joined the four Nixon appointees to form a majority of
the Court, and where justice White has declined to join-such as was the case with inventory
searches in Opperman-Justice Stevens, the most recent appointment to the Court, has taken
his place.
190. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
191. Id. at 52.
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did not believe the Constitution required it be decided one way or the
other." But Justice White did make it clear that the search was sanctioned
in Chambers only because "exigent circumstances" were present." Resolu-
tion of the issue in Chambers required a balancing of two separate, although
related privacy interests: the interest in not having one's property detained
while judicial process is sought and the interest in not having one's property
searched in the absence of such process. Justice Harlan's partial dissent
chastised the majority for its decision on the search issue. He asserted that
the fourth amendment itself resolved the question in favor of requiring prior
judicial approval: "I believe it clear that a warrantless search involves the
greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values." "4 Although justice Harlan's
view might be sounder on this issue,195 in fairness to Justice White, the
Court in Chambers did not depart significantly from the logic of Carroll.
Privacy interests were still critical, even in the realm of automobile
searches, and warrants were still required absent exigent circumstances.
The following year, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"6 Justice Stewart
reemphasized that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose pres-
ence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.""' Searches of
automobiles without warrants were held per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment, unless the exigencies of the situation made dispensing
with the warrant imperative." True, Carroll had recognized the "mobility"
of the vehicle as triggering just such an exigent circumstance. According to
Justice Stewart, however, the key consideration was whether, in light of all
surrounding facts, it was impracticable to first secure a search warrant.
Mobility failed to justify a warrantless intrusion in situations where the vehi-
cle probably would not be moved, where the vehicle was under guard,
where those who might want access to the vehicle had been placed into
custody, or where the police had known for some significant period of time
that the automobile had a probable role in the perpetration of the crime."
192. Id. at 51-52.
193. "Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause
serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Id. at 51.
194. Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Justice Harlan's position seems correct when one analyzes the consequences of a mistake
in judgment by the police officers with and without the extension of warrantless searches autho-
rized by Chambers. Absent this extension, if the officers are mistaken about their judgment of
probable cause, but are required to seek a warrant before searching, the search will be avoided,
and only a temporary detention of the automobile will have taken place. With the Chambers
extension, if the officers are mistaken, two illegalities will result-the unlawful detention and
the unlawful search. In this regard, Justice White's analysis seems to break down.
196. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
197. Id. at 461-62. That section of the opinion concerning the mobility doctrine was joined
by only three other justices, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall.
198. Id. at 454-55.
199. Id. at 461-64.
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The real assault upon the right of privacy in one's automobile began in
1973 with Cady v. Dombrowski.- There, the Court upheld the warrantless
search of a trunk of a disabled vehicle that had been towed to a private
storage garage. The defendant had called the police to the scene of an acci-
dent. Upon arrival, the police observed that the defendant appeared intoxi-
cated and arrested him for driving while under the influence. The arresting
officers later ascertained that the defendant was an off-duty Chicago police-
man. Some two and one-half hours after the arrest, one of the arresting
officers traveled to the private storage garage and, without either a search
warrant or the defendant's consent, conducted a thorough search of the car.
The search was allegedly conducted to find the defendant's service revolver,
which had not been found on either the defendant's person or during an
initial search of the car at the scene of the accident.20°
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphasized
that "[tihe ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness." 202 After deciding that searches such as the one at issue were
not unreasonable solely because a warrant had not first been obtained,213
Justice Rehnquist then determined that the specific search at issue was not
unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, noting that "the
police had exercised a form of custody or control over the 1967
Thunderbird."21 " [Elemental reasons of safety" were involved, and "the
search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver was 'standard procedure in [that
police] department,' to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver
would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands." 20 - In light of these
considerations, the search, according to Justice Rehnquist, could not be re-
garded as unreasonable.
The Court's rationale in Cady stands in stark contrast to that found in its
prior decisions, a change emphasized by the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan: "The police knew what they were looking for and had ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant. Under those circumstances, our prior deci-
sions make it clear that the Fourth Amendment required the police to
obtain a warrant prior to the search."'
Curtailment of fourth amendment rights in the realm of automobile
searches continued one year later in Cardwell v. Lewis 2 07 when a plurality of
the Court ruled that the examination of an automobile's exterior did not
significantly implicate privacy interests to trigger fourth amendment protec-
tions. Observations made of an automobile tire's tread and the taking of
200. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
201. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 439.
203. Id. at 447-48.
204. id. at 442-43.
205. Id. at 443 (quoting State v. Dombrowski, 319 F. Supp. 530, 531 (E.D. Wis. 1970))
(brackets in original).
206. Id. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
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paint scrapings from the automobile's exterior were not found to be "sear-
ches" because, according to Justice Blackmun, "the invasion of privacy, 'if it
can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.' " The more important
aspect of justice Blackmun's opinion, however, was broad dictum explicitly
announcing for the first time that "[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy
in a motor vehicle" than one has in respect to his residence or his person. 2"
The dictum of Cardwell was elevated to the status of law two years later
in South Dakota v. Opperman.21" The Opperman decision represents the
most serious retrenchment to date of fourth amendment protections in the
area of automobile searches. Writing for a bare majority of the Court, " '
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that not only was the expectation of privacy
in respect to automobiles less than in the case of one's home or office, it was
"significantly less.""l2 In upholding an inventory search of the impounded
vehicle in Opperman, the Chief Justice noted that automobiles are subject
to pervasive and continuing governmental regulations, controls, inspections,
and licensing requirements; that automobile travel is public in nature; and
that "community caretaking functions" are frequently necessary to protect
the public safety and promote the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. 1'
Furthermore, the Court observed that the search in Opperman was carried
out in accordance with "standard police procedure" to protect the owner's
property against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and to pro-
tect the police from potential danger.214 Such a search, the majority con-
cluded, could not be called unreasonable under the fourth amendment.1 '
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Opperman succinctly epitomized
the drift of the Supreme Court's opinions in the area of automobile searches.
According to Justice Marshall, the majority's logic completely shattered the
208. Id. at 592 (quoting Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861,
865 (1974)).
209. Id. at 590. In his dissenting opinion in Cardwell, Justice Stewart stressed again that
Carroll and its progeny did not support the treatment of automobile searches as any less worthy
of fourth amendment protection than others.
[T]he Carroll doctrine simply recognizes the obvious-that a moving automobile on
the open road presents a situation "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." . . . Where there is not reasonable likelihood that the
automobile would or could be moved, the Carroll doctrine is simply inapplicable.
Id. at 597-98 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
210. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
211. The Chief Justice was joined in his opinion by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stevens. Id. at 364.
212. Id. at 367.
213. Id. at 368-69.
214. Id. at 369.
215. Id. at 369-71. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell summarized the process utilized
by the majority in resolving the issue. "Resolution of this question requires a weighing of the
governmental and societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions against the constitution-
ally protected interests of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects." Id. at 377-78
(Powell, J., concurring).
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prior doctrine requiring probable cause even for automobile searches." The
interests in privacy protected by the fourth amendment, he stressed, were
being subordinated to the mere interest of conserving property. 17
The decisions in this area clearly indicate a significant abridgment of
fourth amendment rights in respect to vehicular searches."' Not surprisingly,
in virtually all these decisions, the same justices who have expressed disdain
for the exclusionary rule have voted to circumvent its operation by sanction-
ing the police conduct under scrutiny. It is of course possible that this pat-
tern of substantive retreat is consistent with hypotheses other than avoid-
ance of the exclusionary rule. Yet, what cogent reasons can be advanced for
dispensing with the warrant requirement in the absence of exigent circum-
stances, other than avoidance of the exclusionary rule's deleterious effects
on the criminal justice system? Convenience? Cost savings? No serious
doubt can exist that, assuming the exclusionary rule were eliminated as a
decisional factor in fourth amendment cases, the standard would be as stated
by Chief Justice Taft in Carroll, namely, that "[i]n cases where the securing
of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used,"29 regardless of
whether the area searched is one's home or one's automobile.
216. Id. at 386 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 395-96.
218. The Supreme Court's decisions in two recent cases give reason for some hope that the
concept of mobility is not altogether dead in analyzing searches connected with automobiles. In
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court held that a warrant was required to
search a locked footlocker which the defendants had placed in the trunk of a car immediately
before their arrest. The Government, however, did not rely on the mobility doctrine. Instead,
it argued that only homes, offices and private communications implicate interests which lie at
the core of the fourth amendment. Id. at 7.
The issue not faced in Chadwick has now been squarely faced and decided against the Gov-
ernment in the recent case of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1974). In the majority opin-
ion, Justice Powell wrote that the mobility exception did not permit a warrantless search of
personal luggage seized from an automobile.
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be
assessed at the point immediately before the search-after the police have seized
the object to be searched-and have it securely within their control .... Once
police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no
way affected by the place from which it is taken.
Id. at 763 (footnotes omitted).
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented in both Chadwick and Sanders. One need only
examine Justice Blackmun's dissent in Chadwick to conclude that the future does not bode well
for searches in this area of the law.
I would apply the rationale of these two lines of authority and hold generally that a
warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property in the possession
of a person properly arrested in a public place. A person arrested in a public place
is likely to have various kinds of property with him: items inside his clothing, a
briefcase or suitcase, packages, or a vehicle.
433 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. 267 U.S. at 156.
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Stop and Frisk Encounters
In the landmark case of Terry,"° the Supreme Court faced for the first
time the serious question of the fourth amendment's role "in the confronta-
tion on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspi-
cious circumstances." " More specifically, the Court in Terry had to decide
whether and under what circumstances law enforcement officers could, in-
vade certain privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment on a
showing of less than probable cause.
The facts leading to Terry's arrest and eventual conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon were set forth by the Court in considerable detail. Officer
McFadden, a Cleveland police detective with thirty-nine years' experience,
had his attention drawn one afternoon to two men standing at a street cor-
ner. After observing these two men (and later a third), Officer McFadden
concluded that they were "casing a job" for a robbery and were very likely
armed and dangerous.- When "the situation was ripe for direct action," '
the officer approached the suspects, identified himself as a police officer, and
asked their names. Receiving only a mumbled response to his request, the
officer spun Terry around and patted down the outside of his clothing. A
weapon was felt, seized, and ultimately introduced into evidence at Terry's
trial. The officer testified that he made the pat down only to determine
whether the suspect was armed, and that he never placed his hands under-
neath the suspect's outer garments until the weapon was felt.-
In upholding the police conduct, Chief Justice Warren stressed that the
situation required "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat."' Because a warrant could not be
obtained under these circumstances, the conduct had to be tested by the
fourth amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' In ruling that the conduct was not unreasonable, the Chief Jus-
tice laid down a standard requiring the police "to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 227 "Inarticulate hunches" were
simply not sufficient.2Y8 Central to the Court's decision in Terry were four
factors, all of which were present before any police action was taken: (1) that
the action was taken as a result of reasoned conclusions based upon personal
observations of a police officer of much experience; (2) that in the officer's
opinion swift measures were needed to neutralize the threat of harm to
220. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id. at 5-6.
223. Id. at 6-7.
224. Id. at 7.
225. id. at 20.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
228. Id. at 22.
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others; (3) that the officer had first identified himself, and (4) that the officer
had made reasonable inquiries which failed to allay his fears.-5
The Burger Court has carried the "stop and frisk" exception announced in
Terry considerably beyond the circumstances originally posited to justify its
use. In Adams v. Williams,m the Court upheld the seizure of a weapon by a
police officer acting on an informant's tip of very questionable reliability. A
person known to the officer had supplied information that an individual
seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist.
After receiving this information, the officer approached the vehicle and
asked the occupant to open the door. When the occupant rolled down the
window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a fully loaded
revolver from Williams' waistband. Williams was arrested for illegal posses-
sion of a pistol, and a search incident to the arrest yielded narcotics for
which the defendant was ultimately prosecuted and convicted.2I
Evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that the only
information the unnamed informant had ever given to the officer before the
incident in question involved homosexual conduct in a local railroad station.
No substantiating information had been found to support that alleged activ-
ity, and no arrests had ever been made. 2 Furthermore, no facts were pre-
sented to establish that the informant had ever seen the gun, that the officer
knew either the owner of the car or the identity of the occupant, or that the
gun was in fact illegally possessed by the occupant.m This last failure in the
showing was particularly important because Connecticut law allowed its
citizens to carry weapons, concealed or otherwise, provided they first
obtained a permit.'
Absent from the facts established in Adans was the immediate threat to
public safety so important in the Terry decision. The officer in Adams made
no personal observations (other than to confirm the informant's statement
that a man was in a parked car at a certain location), and there was no
indication that crimes (other than perhaps mere possessory ones) were being
committed.
It might certainly be argued that Adams was nothing more than a natural
extension of the doctrine first announced in Terry. After all, it does not
seem to be constitutionally significant whether the "specific and articulable"
facts required by Terry come to the officer through his own observations or
are supplied by a third party. Nevertheless, the quantum of evidence pos-
sessed by the officer in Adams was undeniably less than that which was
available to Officer McFadden in Terry. Adams represents another instance
where the "powerful hydraulic pressures"'' m of the times have caused a dilu-
229. Id. at 30.
230. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
231. Id. at 144-45.
232. Id. at 156-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 158-59.
234. Id. at 149 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
235. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tion of constitutional guarantees. As noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent-
ing opinion in Adams, "[tloday's decision invokes the spector of a society in
which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched, and arrested at the whim
of police officers who have only the slightest suspicion of improper
conduct."
Consent Searches
Recent Supreme Court cases concerning consent searches represent addi-
tional examples of situations in which the Court has deferred to law enforce-
ment wishes at the expense of fourth amendment rights, although curtail-
ment here has taken on a more subtle form. The Court has not so much
diminished the substantive extent of fourth amendment coverage as it has
diluted protections to the exercise of the rights themselves.
In Johnson v. ZerbstY a case concerning waiver of counsel in a criminal
prosecution, the Supreme Court emphasized that a claimed waiver of consti-
tutional rights must receive exacting scrutiny by the judiciary:
[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fun-
damental constitutional rights . . .and do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.M
The Court proceeded to conclude that "the guaranty [of right to counsel]
would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure to
claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitution."''
The current Court, however, has refused to follow the waiver standard
delineated in Johnson, at least in respect to the waiver of one's right to be
free from unreasonable searches and has ruled that the validity of a consent
236. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J. dissenting). Just how much
further the current Court will expand the doctrine of Terry is difficult to predict. Several recent
cases, however, indicate that law enforcement does not possess unbridled discretion to stop and
detain individuals without articulable suspicion. Investigatory detentions on less than probable
cause, which the Court had previously refused to countenance in Davis v. Missouri, 394 U.S.
721 (1969), have also been struck down by the current Court. See Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979) (fourth amendment violated when person is seized and transported to police
station for interrogation absent probable cause); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (fourth and
fourteenth amendments violated when person is stopped and required to identify himself in
absence of reasonable suspicion); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (discretionary stops
of automobiles disallowed in absence of articulated and reasonable suspicion). But see Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (the Court held that whenever the driver of
an automobile has been lawfully stopped, he may be ordered to get out of the car without
violating the fourth amendment, notwithstanding the fact the officers have no reason to suspect
foul play prior to the order). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980)
(DEA agents' request to airline passenger to accompany him to DEA office and subsequent
consensual search not violation of the fourth amendment).
237. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
238. Id. at 464 (footnote omitted).
239. Id. at 465.
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to search depends upon whether it was voluntarily given considering all ol
the surrounding circumstances. 4 This "voluntariness" standard has been
held to apply to custodial as well as noncustodial situations."
In Schneckloth v. Bustamontel2 -a case involving consent obtained in a
noncustodial situation-the Court rejected the notion that a person's knowl-
edge of his right to refuse consent is a sine qua non to an effective waiver.
According to Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion, knowledge of
one's right to refuse consent is only one factor in the determination, and
there is correspondingly no affirmative duty imposed on the prosecution to
prove knowledge as a prerequisite to a determination of voluntariness. 243
Arguably, the majority's holding in Schneckloth did not constitute a
marked departure from doctrinal developments in other areas in which the
waiver question had arisen. As pointed out by Justice Stewart, "the totality
of all the surrounding circumstances" test had long been used to determine
the admissibility of confessions.2" And because the respondent in Schneck-
loth had not been in custody at the time the consent was procured, the
thesis of Miranda-that knowledge of one's rights in a custodial situation is
necessary to counteract the inherently coercive nature of such situations-
was simply inapposite."5 Justice Stewart also made short shrift of the stan-
dard of waiver set forth in Johnson. There was, according to him, a "vast
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment."''  A "strict standard of
waiver" was applicable to the former, while a "diluted" and more "informal"
type of waiver was not necessarily inconsistent with the purposes served by
the latter. 4 According to him, the "waiver" concepts of the Johnson case
were simply inapplicable to consent searches."'8
Justice Stewart was not able to point to any text of the Constitution itself
which justified the treatment of certain constitutional rights with less solici-
240. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
241. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
242. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
243. Id. at 234.
244. Id. at 226. Among the factors cited by justice Stewart included the age of the accused,
his lack of education, his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitu-
tional rights, the length of detention, the nature and length of questioning, and the use of
physical punishment. Id.
245. Id. at 246.
246, Id. at 241.
247, Id. at 241, 245.
248. Id. at 243-46. In justice Stewart's words:
[T]here is nothing in the purposes or application of the waiver requirements of
Johnson v. Zerbst that justifies, much less compels, the easy equation of a knowing
waiver with a consent search .... We decline to follow what one judicial scholar has
termed "the domino method of constitutional adjudication ... wherein every ex-
planatory statement in a previous opinion is made the basis for extension to a
wholly different situation."
Id. at 246 (quoting Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 929, 950 (1965)).
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tude than others. Justice Marshall, in dissent, took issue with Justice Stew-
art, pointing out that a certain difficulty inhered in any standard of waiver or
consent in which the existence of a voluntary choice could be construed in
the absence of knowledge of available alternatives.,"' But even more per-
plexing in Justice Stewart's reasoning is the implicit assumption that if indi-
viduals were made aware of their constitutional rights-in this case, a right
to insist that privacy not be invaded without prior judicial approval-they
might in fact exercise them, making it more difficult for police to gather
evidence.' As a result of the ruling in Schneckloth, law enforcement will
have little incentive to inform citizens of their right to refuse consent. Un-
doubtedly, the consent standard set forth in Schneckloth, and again later in
United States v. Watson,2' which applied the same standard to custodial
consents, relegates fourth amendment protections in this area to the few
who are privileged or educated enough to have knowledge of their rights. 52
In deciding these cases, the Court ignored a consensus of federal and state
courts which had previously regarded a consent to search as a waiver of a
fundamental right, a waiver requiring both freedom of choice and knowledge
of alternatives to be effective.' Again, the Court has charted a course re-
stricting individuals' protections under the fourth amendment for the sake of
avoiding the exclusionary rule.
Searches Incident to Arrest
In three cases decided during its 1973 October Term, the Supreme Court
ruled, in effect, that a person lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest loses all
fourth amendment rights in respect to the privacy of his or her person,
irrespective of the reasons supporting the arrest itself.- These decisions
have expanded greatly a new area in which warrantless searches can be car-
ried out despite the absence of what can be fairly regarded as exigent cir-
249. Id. at 284-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 227. In the words of Justice Stewart, "[in situations where the police have some
evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
251. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
252. 412 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
253. See Bretti v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.) (consent to search upheld when
suspect was advised that he need not consent), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971); Perkins v.
Henderson, 418 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969) (consent to search invalid after failure to inform sus-
pect of his right to refuse consent); Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 255 P. 788 (1927) (consent to
search invalid absent suspect's actual desire to invite the search); Wefing & Miles, Consent
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL
L. REV. 211, 227-40 (1974).
254. See Edwards v. United States, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search and seizure of suspect's
clothing the morning after arrest not violation of fourth amendment); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973) (full search of suspect under lawful custodial arrest held exception to war-
rant requirement of fourth amendment); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (full search
of suspect made incident to lawful arrest not violation of fourth and fourteenth amendments).
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cumstances. Further, the Court's focus in these cases on the "reasonable-
ness" of the search under all the circumstances, as opposed to the feasibility
of procuring a search warrant in light of the particular facts of each case,
marked a significant departure from the limitations set forth in Chimel v.
Californiam which had previously governed searches incident to arrest.
Prior to the Chimel decision, the Court had sustained against
constitutional attack extensive warrantless searches under the rubric that
they were incident to valid arrests. In Harris v. United States,"" the Court
upheld a wide-ranging search of a four-room apartment pursuant to an arrest
that took place in the living room. Similarly, in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 7 the Court refused to strike down a pervasive search of a one-
room business office, citing the principle that law enforcement officials had
authority "to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime."''  In Rabinowitz, the Court re-
jected the rule announced in Trupiano v. United States,-5 which required
law enforcement to obtain search warrants whenever reasonably practicable,
and instead posited that the true test of the fourth amendment was "not
whether it [was] reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable." 210
The Court overruled Harris and Rabinowitz in Chimel" and, in doing so,
imposed rather stringent limitations on both the permissible extent of
searches incident to valid arrests and the constitutional justifications for the
exception itself. Citing Terry, Justice Stewart noted that advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures was the rule rather than the exception,
and that "the scope of a search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."26 2 Applying these
255. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
256. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
257. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
258. Id. at 61.
259. 334 U.S. 699 (1948). In Trupiano, the Court set forth strict standards for warrantless
searches and seizures incident to arrest.
It is a cardinal rule that in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must
secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable. . . .This rule rests
upon the desirability of having magistrates rather than police officers determine
when searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed
upon such activities. . . . To provide the necessary security against unreasonable
intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amend-
ment required adherence to judicial processes wherever possible. And subsequent
history has confirmed the wisdom of that requirement. . . .A search or seizure
without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be
a strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at
the time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the way of necessity
than merely a lawful arrest.
Id. at 705, 708.
260. 339 U.S. at 66.
261. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
262. Id. at 762 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1969)).
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same principles to searches made incident to arrest, the Court ruled in
Chimel that
[wihen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be
governed by a like rule.-
By relying upon Terry, the Chimel Court clearly implied that a search
incident to arrest had to be justified by a particularized showing that it was
reasonably necessary to insure the safety of the officers, to prevent escape,
or to prevent destruction of evidence. The Court, by requiring that the
search be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances giving rise to
it, was certainly not authorizing a full blown search in each case, irrespective
of the reasons giving rise to the arrest itself. As was stated in Sibron v. New
York, decided only one year before Chimel, "the constitutional validity of a
warrantless search [was] pre-eminently the sort of question which [could]
only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case."-
Despite the limiting language of Chimel, and despite the Court's tradi-
tional case-by-case adjudication of reasonableness in fourth amendment
cases, the Court held in the companion cases of United States v. Robinson'
and Gustafson v. Florida 266 that a lawful arrest makes reasonable a full
search of the arrestee's person under the fourth amendment regardless of
the circumstances." The officers need not point to specific and articulable
facts which justify fear for safety; nor need they suspect that evidence will
be found on the arrestee's person.' Furthermore, not only is a full blown
search of the arrestee's person authorized, but also permitted is a probing
examination of any articles thereby found.29
The fourth amendment implications of these decisions can be appreciated
best by focusing on the facts of the cases themselves. Both cases involved
arrests for traffic violations. In Robinson, operating a vehicle after one's
license had been revoked carried a mandatory jail term, mandatory mini-
263. Id. at 762-63.
264. 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1967).
265. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
266. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
267. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 262-63.
268. 414 U.S. at 235.
269. In both Robinson and Gustafson, the officers in question had thoroughly searched
cigarette packages that were found on the defendants' persons. United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. at 232; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 262-63.
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mum fine, or both.27 ° In Gustafson, however, the traffic offense was clearly
minor-failure to have a license in one's possession.2 ' The search of the
defendant was not carried out according to standard arrest procedures prom-
ulgated by the law enforcement agency in question, as was the case in
Robinson,"' and it was entirely likely that the officer in Gustafson intended
to release the arrestee after verifying his story that he had left his license in
his room-which, incidentally, proved to be true.273  Surely Gustafson de-
parted substantially from the requirement of Chimel that the search incident
to arrest be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances giving rise to
it. Even Robinson, as noted in Justice Marshall's dissent, completely ignored
numerous decisions of the lower federal and state courts which had limited
searches incident to the arrests of traffic offenders to the need to protect the
arresting officers from danger."'
In the third case decided during the 1973 October Term, Edwards v.
United States, 7 1 the Supreme Court expanded still further the authority of
police officers to make warrantless intrusions by upholding the seizure of a
jailed defendant's clothing approximately ten hours after the arrest. Revert-
ing to the doctrine of Rabinowitz, which was thought to have been substan-
tially repudiated in Chimel, the Court stated that the true test of the legality
of such intrusions was not whether it was reasonable to obtain a warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable under the circumstances.7 6  Although
the officers in Edwards had reasonable cause to believe the clothing had
evidentiary value at the time of the arrest, seizure was delayed because they
were not able to procure substitute clothing until the next morning. Because
of its unusual facts, Edwards might be regarded as only a minor extension of
the Robinson and Gustafson decisions. Yet, it clearly erodes still further the
traditional fourth amendment view that searches conducted outside the judi-
cial process are per se unreasonable absent "a few specifically established
and well delineated exceptions." 2 7
Privacy Interests
The protections of the fourth amendment only obtain in those instances in
which one has a justifiable expectation of privacy.7 ' The parameters of a
270. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-302(d) (1967); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
271. 414 U.S. at 263.
272. Id. at 265 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 n.2 (1973)).
273. Id. at 262-63 n.2.
274. 414 U.S. at 244-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
276. Id. at 805.
277. Id. at 809 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-55 (1971), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
278. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In Justice Harlan's words, "there is a
two fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' " Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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justifiable expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment are, of course,
a matter of federal constitutional law. The foregoing has attempted to sug-
gest that the Supreme Court has pursued a number of doctrinal develop-
ments in order to avoid the untoward results of the exclusionary rule. For
example, in the areas of automobile searches 279 and searches incident to
arrest, the Court has upheld warrantless searches which, under traditional
analysis, would have required prior judicial approval. In the area of consent
searches, the Court has made it less difficult for police to avoid assertion of
the rights themselves. But perhaps the most deleterious route taken by the
Court to circumvent the exclusionary rule has been the curtailment of the
interests themselves which one might have reasonably expected to remain
free from governmental intrusion. Controversies in this area have generally
reached the Supreme Court in the context of challeges to a litigant's "stand-
ing" to raise fourth amendment issues. These standing challenges have been
essentially of two types: cases in which the government claims that no intru-
sion cognizable under the fourth amendment has taken place; -o and cases in
which a fourth amendment intrusion has admittedly occurred, but the par-
ticular litigant is claimed not to have suffered a personal "injury in fact." ' ,
An example of the first type of challenge is United States v. Miller,"'z
decided by the Court in 1976. In Miller, a grand jury had subpoenaed the
defendant's account records from two separate banks in connection with a
tax investigation. Defendant's motion to suppress based upon allegedly de-
fective subpoenas was denied by the trial court. In upholding the defend-
ant's conviction, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of the sub-
poenas' sufficiency because it concluded that the defendant had no standing
to make such a challenge. The Court ruled that the government had not
intruded into the realm of defendant's protected fourth amendment interest.
Analogizing to several "misplaced confidence" cases,3 the Court reasoned
that Miller had voluntarily chosen to deal with the banks in question and
thus could not be heard to complain that the state had invaded an area in
which he could reasonably expect privacy.' As noted by Justice Brennan in
dissent, however, "the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their
279. The Supreme Court has also indicated in the realm of automobile searches that citizens
have lesser expectations of privacy. See text accompanying notes 183-219 supra.
280. See notes 282-286 and accompanying text infra.
281. See notes 287-306 and accompanying text infra.
282. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
283. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (government's use of agents who them-
selves reveal contents of conversation with an accused not violation of fourth amendment); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (suspect's misplaced confidence in government informer
who did not disclose his role not violation of fourth amendment); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (1966) (use of recording device by defendant's employee who had agreed to report any
illegal activities to federal agents upheld); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (admit-
tance of narcotics purchased by undercover agent at defendant's trial not violation of fourth
amendment).
284. 425 U.S. at 441-43.
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financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining
a bank account.""' In his view, the fourth amendment protects private
bank records from government access. Judicial supervision of attempts to
gain release of this information was consequently required by the
Constitution. 2
Rakas v. Illinois 28 illustrates the second category of cases. Undoubtedly, a
fourth amendment violation was present in Rakas, but the Court refused to
acknowledge that the petitioners there were the true victims of it. The facts
in Rakas were straightforward. A police officer on routine patrol received a
radio bulletin, informing him that a robbery had been committed and de-
scribing the getaway car. Shortly thereafter, the officer spotted an auto-
mobile that he suspected could be the vehicle in question. After the auto
was followed for a period of time, it was forcibly stopped, all occupants were
ordered out, and a thorough search of the interior was conducted. (Evident-
ly, the petitioners did not claim at the trial that the stop itself was unlawful
for lack of reasonable and articulable suspicion under the Terry doctrine.)
During this search, the officers seized a box of rifle shells from the glove
compartment (which had been locked) and a sawed-off rifle from underneath
the front passenger seat. Petitioners were then arrested and charged with
armed robbery.-
Before trial, the defendants moved to suppress the rifle and shells, alleg-
ing an unconstitutional search and seizure. They conceded they did not own
the car, and admitted they were merely passengers. Nor did they contend
that they owned either the rifle or the shells. Based upon these facts, the
Illinois trial court ruled that it did not need to pass on the legality of the
search and seizure because petitioners lacked "standing." '289 The Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed, stating that "without a proprietary or other similar
interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to chal-
lenge the legality of the search of the vehicle."' 90 The United States Su-
preme Court concurred, acknowledging that a fourth amendment violation
was present, but that the petitioners were not the true victims of it. In
affirming the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, Justice Rehnquist, for
a bare majority of the Court, substantially curtailed the "expectation of
privacy" development which had appeared in the Court's prior decisions.
Previously, in Jones v. United States,9' the Court concluded that "anyone
legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality
285. Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238,
247, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (1974)).
286. 428 U.S. at 447-48, 451.
287. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The petitioners did not claim at the trial level that the stop itself
was unlawful for lack of reasonable and articulate suspicion under the Terry doctrine. Id. at 160
n.5 (White, J., dissenting). See notes 220-229 and accompanying text supra.
288. Id. at 129-30.
289. Id. at 130-31.
290. Id. at 131. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to grant petitioners leave to appeal. Id.
at 132.
291. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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. . . when its fruits are proposed to be used against him." 2 The petitioner
in Jones had been given the use of a friend's apartment. Jones had a key to
the premises, but paid nothing for the use of the apartment. At the time of
the search, he had spent "maybe a night" there, and the owner had been
away for about five days.293 Federal officers searched the apartment pur-
suant to a warrant, later alleged to be defective by the petitioner, and seized
narcotics from a bird's nest located in an awning just outside a window. ' In
holding that Jones had standing to challenge the search, the Court
announced the so-called "automatic" standing rule, which confers the status
on anyone who contests an allegedly illegal search in a situation where the
same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of the
offense charged.2 5  The Court made it clear in Jones, however, that the
petitioner's legitimate presence on the premises would be, in itself, suffi-
cient to confer standing, even if the offense charged was not possessory.2'
Seven years later, in Katz v. United States,297 the Supreme Court unequivo-
cally settled the question of whether fourth amendment interests depended
for their existence on common law property interests, when it stated that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.""' After Katz the key
inquiry in each case became whether the governmental activities at issue
'violated the privacy upon which [a petitioner] justifiably relied." 29
Although the Rakas case does not overrule per se the doctrine of the
Jones case which confers standing on litigants who are legitimately on the pre-
mises searched," it certainly has curtailed the roles of both Jones and Katz in de-
292. Id. at 267.
293. Id. at 259.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 264. In the very recent case of United States v. Salvucci, 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980),
the Supreme Court has specifically overruled the so-called "automatic standing" doctrine of
Jones. Id. at 2553. Consequently, those now charged with crimes of possession no longer have
automatic standing to challenge the methods used to obtain the evidence against them. It was
Justice Rehnquist who wrote the majority opinion, and clearly, the disdain for the exclusionary
rule again figured prominently.
We are unwilling to tolerate the exclusion of probative evidence under such cir-
cumstances since we adhere to the view of Alderman that the values of the Fourth
Amendment are preserved by a rule which limits the availability of the exclusionary
rule to defendants who have been subjected to a violation of their Fourth Amend-
ment rights.
Id. at 2554.
296. 362 U.S. 265-67. The Jones Court further maintained:
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the
criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises
where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress,
when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.
Id. at 267.
297. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
298. Id. at 351.
299. Id. at 353.
300. After Rakas, it may be that the "standing" rubric will disappear altogether. As Justice
Rehnquist noted in the majority opinion of Rakas, the standing requirement "is more properly
subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine." 439 U.S. at 139. Rehnquist con-
tinued:
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ciding whether litigants' expectations of privacy are reasonable. In Rakas,
the Court seems to have resurrected in substantial part the discredited doc-
trine of Olmstead v. United States,"°  which linked fourth amendment rights
to interests in property.30 According to Justice Rehnquist, "the phrase
'legitimately on premises' coined in Jones create[d] too broad a gauge for mea-
surement of Fourth Amendment rights." The fact that the petitioners were
present in the car with permission of its owner was not, therefore, determina-
tive of whether they had a reasonable expectation of privacy.' Furthermore,
the majority very nearly stated that the petitioners' failure to assert either a
property or possessory interest in either the car or the items seized itself con-
trolled the outcome.' Indeed, even Justice White who had so often joined in
prior decisions narrowly construing fourth amendment rights, was prompted to
say in dissent that "[tlhe Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects property, not people."
It is difficult to reconcile Rakas with Jones. That an auto search was in-
volved in Rakas, whereas Jones involved the search of a dwelling, was
admitted by Justice Rehnquist to be unimportant to the decision. The Court
made a feeble attempt to distinguish the cases by stressing that Jones pos-
sessed a key to the premises, kept possessions in the apartment, and, except
for his friend, had complete dominion and control over the area in
question. 7  When one considers, however, that the evidence in Jones was
found in a bird's nest located in an awning outside the premises, these dis-
tinctions lose their persuasiveness. One cannot help but suspect that here,
as in the areas examined previously, the Court's antipathy toward the exclu-
sionary rule has played a substantial part in the substantive retreat. Indeed,
Rigorous application of the principle that the rights secured by [the fourth] amend-
ment are personal, in place of a notion of 'standing' will produce no additional
situations in which evidence must be excluded. The inquiry under either approach
is the same. But we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a
particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any
theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
301. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
302. In a footnote, the Court attempted to convince the dissenters it was not upsetting the
holding of Katz which stated that property interests are not determinative of fourth amendment
rights. It stressed that the petitioners had not claimed they were entitled to any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the areas of the car searched, but had only insisted that they were
legitimately in the car. But the majority is simply begging the question, here, since its prior
cases-specifically Jones-had explicitly held that one who is "legitimately on the premises"
ipso facto has a justifiable expectation of privacy and thus standing to contest the intrusion at
issue. 439 U.S. at 149 n.17.
303. 439 U.S. at 142 (footnote omitted).
304. Id. at 148.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 156 (White, J., dissenting).
307. id. at 149.
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Justice White himself expressed such a sentiment in his dissenting opinion
in Rakas:
Because the majority's conclusion has no support in the Court's controlling
decisions, in the logic of the Fourth Amendment, or in common sense, I
must respectfully dissent. If the Court is troubled by the practical impact
of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule's continued
validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to
reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific cases."
III. A DEFENSE OF JUSTICE WHITE'S GOOD FAITH
EXCLUSIONARY RULE STANDARD
REVISING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The foregoing analysis was devoted in significant part to demonstrating
that the current Court has haltingly, yet inexorably moved toward adopting
a good faith standard for the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment cases.
Perhaps the most perspicuous formulation of this standard is that enunci-
ated by Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell:
[T]he rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application
in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an
officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with ex-
isting law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.-
It was suggested previously that the present exclusionary rule, instead of
befriending the fourth amendment, may have become the primary hindrance
to its liberal interpretation. This threat, standing alone, is serious enough to
call for modification of the rule along the lines suggested by Justice White in
his Stone dissent. The adoption of a good faith approach also might go far
toward eliminating the kind of questionable logic that has laced some recent
opinions of the Court- Michigan v. DeFillippo31 o being a notable example.
Even if the above considerations are disregarded (to satisfy those empiricists
who abhor speculation), adoption of a good faith standard to guide imple-
mentation of the present rule, and as opposed to eliminating the rule
altogether, remains salutary because numerous systemic advantages would
attend its imposition. A few of these advantages deserve mention here.
While eliminating the application of the exclusionary rule in the great
majority of cases, a good faith standard would preserve judicial review of
fourth amendment questions. In the absence of such a channel, most fourth
amendment questions would be relegated to infrequent civil appeals for such
review. It is also important to maintain public interest in the rights pro-
tected by the fourth amendment, and press coverage of motions to suppress
308. Id.
309. 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
310. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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evidence in important cases would provide an effective medium for that pur-
pose. In short, preserving the exclusionary rule for serious violations will
help ensure that the limits of social tolerance are regularly tested.
Further, application of a good faith standard would maintain public re-
spect for the judicial system, while at the same time eliminating the criti-
cism that criminal justice turns on the litigation of technicalities. The revised
standard will direct contempt away from the judicial system and toward
those who rightfully deserve it-police officers who violate the law in bad
faith. The revised exclusionary rule will also tend to eliminate those corrupt
police practices through which officers immunize criminals by intentionally
conducting unlawful searches and seizures. Under the present rule, officers
can confer immunity by intrusions which are arguably nothing more than
mistakes of judgment. If the unscrupulous officer conducts the type of bad
faith violation that will trigger the revised standard, he or she risks the se-
rious possibility of criminal prosecution.
Because Justice White's formulation of the good faith standard requires
that the officer in question have "reasonable grounds" for his or her good
faith belief,3" an objective factor is incorporated into the rule. That is, when
the Constitution has been violated, the prosecution must cite relevant statu-
tory or case law or extant administrative procedures which reasonably sup-
port the conduct under scrutiny. Without this objective criterion, trial
judges could circumvent application of the rule in tough cases by making
factual findings favorable to the prosecution on the mental state question.
Such findings would be practically unreviewable. Because of local pressures,
trial judges are currently loath to make exclusionary rulings, but the objec-
tive criterion contained in Justice White's formulation helps ensure that
appellate review will be meaningful when local pressures have prevailed.
Additionally, the good faith standard will prevent the government from
choosing to violate the fourth amendment willfully whenever it is prepared
to pay civil damages as the price for securing desired evidence. In this re-
spect, the proposed good faith standard differs markedly from the test
formulated by the American Law Institute." Under the ALI approach, the
exclusionary rule is applied only if the court finds that a fourth amendment
violation is "substantial." Violations which are "gross, willful and prejudicial
to the accused" are considered "substantial" as a matter of law.313 The exis-
tence vel non of substantiality in other instances is determined by applying a
balancing approach to six separate considerations:
(i) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(ii) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(iii) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(iv) the extent to which exclusion will prevent violations of the model
code;
311. See text accompanying note 309 supra.
312. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (1975).
313. Id.
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(v) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been
discovered; and
(vi) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability
to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in
which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against
him. 314
Under the ALI test, then, gross violations which are not willful, and willful
violations which are not gross, undergo the balancing test under the six-
factor approach, and thus stand a chance of escaping application of the rule
altogether. Justice White's good faith standard precludes such a possibility,
and properly so. The correct normative judgment here must be that if proof
exists of the government's intentional violation of the law, the evidence must
be excluded irrespective of the degree of flagrancy. Government participa-
tion in willful lawlessness should not be countenanced under any
circumstances."' The ALI's failure to make exclusion mandatory whenever a
violation is objectively either gross or willful, however, has a more serious
defect. It affords trial judges broad discretion to avoid the rule whenever it
would be popular to do so. The ALI's balancing process simply provides too
loose a standard to govern adjudication of fourth amendment issues in the
many tough cases that arise in this area.
The revised standard, because it will be limited to bad faith violations,
will hopefully encourage the states to devise alternative procedures to deter
violations of lesser severity. And finally, and perhaps of greatest importance,
the revised rule will eliminate the hypocrisy of the current system which
places blame on underpaid policemen in myriad instances where they are
not fairly deserving of fault. Society expects police officers to react with dis-
patch and often with force. It seems unfair to expect them-or any other
group for that matter-to react with the detachment and reflection of a
neutral magisterial official.
RESPONDING TO MAJOR CRITICISMS
Critics of revisions similar to Justice White's good faith standard have mar-
shalled their arguments around four major themes: (1) that a standard geared
primarily to "willfulness" would put a premium on the ignorance of the
police officer; 316 (2) that a good faith standard would "alter the true extent of
fourth amendment protections;""' (3) that a good faith standard would vitiate
314. Id.
315. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
316. One commentator has suggested that the exclusionary rule be held inapplicable where
the constitutional violation by the officer is inadvertent. The major problem envisioned from
this proposal, however, is that a modification of this nature would put a premium on the ignor-
ance of the police officer, and, more significantly, on the department which trained him. See
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974).
317. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 635, 656 (1978).
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
much of the deterrent efficacy of the present rule;-"" and (4) that a good faith
standard would deprive victims of unintentional violations of any effective
remedy. Thoughtful analysis reveals that these contentions lack merit.
The First Criticism
The argument that a standard geared primarily to "willfulness" would put
a premium on ignorance of the police officer is predicated on the assumption
(a false one in the case of Justice White's good faith standard) that there
would be no objective limitation on the ability of police to avoid application
of the rule by claiming ignorance of the law. It has already been seen that
the good faith standard proposed by Justice White in his Stone dissent has
two prongs, both of which must be satisfied if the operation of the rule is to
be avoided. Not only must the officer have a good-faith belief that his con-
duct is lawful, but also he must have reasonable grounds to believe that his
conduct comports with existing law.' Consequently, there is within the
ambit of the standard itself a significant, objective limitation on the ability of
ignorance, whether genuine or contrived, to shield fourth amendment viola-
tions from the exclusionary result. While the first prong will often require
trial judges to undertake the difficult evaluation of the officer's subjective
state of mind, the second prong will eliminate the need for this evaluation
where violations have transgressed certain objective legal limits.
The Second Criticism
The argument that a good faith standard would "alter the true extent of
fourth amendment protections"32 posits that the threshold at which a par-
ticular rule imposes its exclusionary result will tend to establish actual police
practices near that threshold. This criticism insists that if the threshold is
"probable cause," as under the present rule, the police will abide by that
standard in executing their duties. If the threshold were changed to "good
faith," however, the argument goes that the police would abandon "probable
cause" as the gauge for their conduct and would substitute for it a "good
faith" standard, thus taking action whenever they determined a "reasonable
ground" existed to justify their conduct. According to this criticism, then,
although the "probable cause" standard might continue to exist in theory as
the touchstone of fourth amendment analysis, the actual standard of police
practice will be determined by the tolerance level set by the governing ex-
clusionary rule. The gravamen of this criticism is that the police will attempt
318. The United States Supreme Court, acting as its own critic, has recognized that where
official action is pursued in complete good faith, the deterrence rationale underlying the exclu-
sionary rule loses much of its force. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). Accord,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
1980).
319. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
320. See note 317 supra.
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to carry out in practice whatever arguably has a chance of passing judicial scru-
tiny.
Underlying this argument is an unjustified paranoia that law enforcement
officers as a group are law violators in practice, and consequently need
penalties, or, as Justice Brennan calls them, "incentives," to secure their
compliance with constitutional rules. This reasoning unfairly deprecates both
the intentions of law enforcement officers as a whole and their actual per-
formance in the execution of their duties. Whether the exclusionary rule
retains its present form or is modified along the lines of the good faith pro-
posal discussed previously, official compliance with the fourth amendment
ultimately assumes a willingness on the part of law enforcement to obey the
law. To presume that the exclusionary rule in any of its guises will deter bad
faith violations of the fourth amendment is naive, especially considering that
willful violators can always distort the facts at a suppression hearing to avoid
the exclusion of the fruits of their unlawful conduct. 321 Whereas training and
education must ultimately constitute the chief facilities through which law-
abiding officers are equipped to comply with fourth amendment strictures,
only direct means such as criminal sanctions, civil tort remedies, internal
departmental investigations, and more circumspect recruiting practices can
realistically be expected to deter intentional violations of search and seizure
law.
The Third Criticism
The argument that a good faith standard would vitiate much of the deter-
rent efficacy of the present rule assumes first of all that the currerit rule
appreciably deters fourth amendment violations, and, relatedly, that an ex-
clusionary rule of evidence is the most effective means to encourage law
enforcement to keep abreast of search and seizure doctrine. Several concep-
tual defects that seriously weaken the exclusionary rule's impact in dis-
couraging fourth amendment violations were already discussed: (1) it only
operates when gathering evidence is relevant; (2) rules are often arcane and
ineffectively communicated; and (3) the penalty operates only indirectly on
the violators themselves. 2 2  Indeed, these shortcomings may explain why
empirical studies have failed to demonstrate the deterrent efficacy of the
rule.3 " In short, whether the exclusionary rule really does deter unlawful
invasions of privacy remains an open question.
321. Many commentators have emphasized that the exclusionary rule fails to effectively deter
official lawlessness in securing evidence. See Watchmen, supra note 52; LaFave, Improving
Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part 1, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391 (1965); Oaks,
supra note 52; Comment, The Impeachment Exception: Decline of the Exclusionary Rule?, 8
IND. L.J. 865 (1975).
322. See notes 152-154 and accompanying text supra; Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621, 666, 670.
323. See notes 148-154 and accompanying text supra.
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Even for the great majority of police officers who are naturally inclined to
heed legal requirements, however, knowledge of the law will be a prere-
quisite to compliance over the long term. In evaluating any version of the
exclusionary rule, the crucial consideration, then, must be its educative
effect.'" The rule deters at all only if it can be regarded as enhancing the
likelihood that law enforcement personnel will keep apprised of fourth
amendment developments. The implicit reasoning of those who argue in
favor of the rule's deterrent value must be either that the threat of excluding
evidence is more efficacious in inducing ongoing education than other
means; or, that despite the possibility of other more effective means, the
deterrent value of the rule is substantial enough in its own right to justify
compromising effective law enforcement. Yet, even if an affirmative nod
could be given to either proposition, because Justice White's proposal con-
tains an objective limit on the possibility that ignorance will shield violations
from the rule's operation, no reasonable basis appears for concluding that
the exclusionary rule's effectiveness in facilitating this educative process
would be measurably diminished by changing the threshold at which the
rule is triggered from probable cause to good-faith belief. More importantly,
it seems highly imprudent to depend primarily upon the speculative assist-
ance of the exclusionary rule to educate police in fourth amendment require-
ments.
The Fourth Criticism
The fourth criticism-that a good faith standard would deprive victims of
unintentional violations of any effective remedy-also fails because of many
of the same conceptual weaknesses of the exclusionary rule. For example, no
exclusionary rule of evidence can provide any relief for the innocent victims
of fourth amendment violations. Nor can such a rule provide redress where
no prosecution follows the seizure of incriminating evidence.
Nevertheless, under the present rule victims of good faith violations share
and share alike with victims of intentional and otherwise egregious unlawful
invasions of their privacy in benefiting from the exclusionary result; while
under the revised standard, a whole category of "guilty" victims will no
longer be rewarded when a constable blunders in good faith. This fourth criti-
cism, then, differs somewhat from the others. Each of the first three criticisms
supposed that some undesirable effect would result from changing the rule. In
answering these criticisms, the undesirability of each result was conceded, but it
was then suggested that the results themselves were not likely to occur as a
consequence of the recommended exclusionary rule change. With the present
criticism, however, the result itself-the deprivation of victims of good faith
324. Professor Paulsen has been a major proponent of the argument advancing the educa-
tional effect of the exclusionary rule. See Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure,
52 Nw. U.L. REV. 65, 74 (1957). See also Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A
Requium for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 37.
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violations of the exclusionary remedy-is more than a prediction; it is defini-
tional. Thus, in approaching this criticism, the pertinent question is not whether
the result is probable, but whether it is acceptable. This question cannot be
resolved without making value judgments and balancing the interests at issue.
The fact that the fourth amendment has been construed by the courts to
require what are sometimes rather technical procedures does not perforce
support the conclusion that stringent penalties should be imposed whenever
these procedures are violated. In its current form, the exclusionary rule, in
veritable meat-ax fashion, imposes its sanction regardless of the seriousness
of the infraction or the seriousness of the crime. It totally discounts society's
legitimate interest in safety and security, and it unrealistically resolves the
tension between the theoretical and practical aspects of fourth amendment
strictures. Just as the Supreme Court should free itself of the exclusionary
rule in its present form and thereby remove the pressure to "fit" fourth
amendment doctrine to accommodate police conduct in individual cases, so
too should the legal community discard the idea that society is threatened
each time a police officer's conduct happens to fall short of the ideal proce-
dures articulated by the judiciary. Society, of course, must avoid at any cost
a system of laws that encourages unreasonable invasions of privacy. Equally
true, however, is that regardless of what rules the courts delineate in con-
struing the fourth amendment, numerous instances will still remain in which
actual practices will fail to pass strict fourth amendment scrutiny. The ulti-
mate result of any regime of judicial enforcement that imposes inflexible
penalties without remembering Blackstone's admonition, "[when a penalty is
excessive] the public will out of humanity prefer impunity to it,", must be
an erosion of respect for both the laws themselves and the institutions inter-
preting them.
CONCLUSION
In his now famous article "Who Will Watch the Watchman? ' 326 Chief
Justice Burger suggested that perhaps all those concerned about fourth
amendment protections could agree on two basic propositions:
[F]irst, that deterring official misconduct in law enforcement is a vital
objective for society; and second, that society and the administration of
justice are best served by vastly reducing, and if possible eliminating, the
need to exclude relevant and probative evidence from a criminal trial
whose very truth-seeking function is necessarily stultified to some degree
by such exclusion."'
The great majority of those who insist on preserving the exclusionary rule in
its present form argue that no workable alternative will encourage the police
to obey the law. But as one author has stated, "[i]f this excuse did not come
325. 4 W. BLACKstONE, COMMENTARIES 14-17 (Beacon Series 1962).




from such respected sources, one would be tempted to term it an expression
of intellectual bankruptcy." - Indeed, it is an indictment against the entire
American legal system that it has entrusted protection of this important body
of rights to such a woefully deficient remedy.
This Article has attempted to show not only that the present exclusionary
rule can never be expected to effectively deter official misconduct, but also
that its continuing existence may have become the greatest, single impedi-
ment to a liberal elaboration of fourth amendment doctrine. As has been
seen, five justices of the current Court have indicated they are willing to
consider a good faith approach to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
Recently, by a vote of 13-10, judges of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in a landmark en banc decision have ruled that thence-
forth, in their circuit,
when evidence is sought to be excluded because of police conduct leading
to its discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence to urge
that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in
a reasonable, good-faith belief that it was proper. If the court so finds, it
shall not apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence."'
This case soon will present the United States Supreme Court with an excel-
lent opportunity to consider once again modification of the rule along the
lines of the good faith standard suggested by Justice White in his Stone
dissent. This time it is hoped the Court will meet the challenge head-on,
will avoid questionable sidestepping tactics like those employed in DeFil-
lippo, and will rid the jurisprudence of the fourth amendment of this inflexi-
ble rule once and for all.
328. Wilkey, The exclusionary rule: why suppress valid evidence?, 62 JuD. 214, 227 (1978).
329. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1980).
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